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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
International Organizations as Information
Providers: How Investors and Governments Utilize
Optimistic IMF Forecasts
by
Abdulhadi Sahin
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science,
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014.
Professors Nathan Jensen and Andrew C. Sobel, Co-chairs
A large literature in political science has examined International Monetary Fund’s (IMF
or Fund) lending and monitoring activities and has shown that the Fund sometimes
deviates from its original mandates and provides preferential treatment to certain
countries. The studies suggests that geopolitical and financial interests of the major
shareholders of the Fund and the Fund’s bureaucratic incentives to preserve its power
and prestige are the main determinants of this behavior. There are also a few studies
that demonstrate the same pattern in the Fund’s forecasting activities. What is missing
in this literature is how other actors such as investors and incumbent governments
respond to this behavior and utilize optimistic macroeconomic forecasts. This
dissertation argues that optimistic IMF forecasts provide non-economic information to
the investors, therefore they respond to them accordingly. Moreover optimistic forecasts
x
enable incumbent governments to pursue expansionary policies and help them to
portray the future in a positive light. By comparing IMF forecasts to those of private
institutions this dissertation shows that investors respond positively to the IMF
optimism for countries that are closely allied with the United States and that have large
outstanding debt to the Fund. The empirical analyses also show that optimistic
forecasts encourage public spending and thus increase government’s chances for
reelection.
xi
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the most important characteristics of international organizations (IOs) is their
ability to provide quality information. IOs provide information on the current state of
the member countries and their intended policy positions. By providing this
information, IOs reduce transaction costs and problems of incomplete information, and
therefore, facilitate international cooperation and policy coordination. Keohane (1982)
argues that the ability of IOs to provide such information is one of the reasons IOs are
created in the first place and why they continue to survive.
The value of any information depends on its accuracy and utility. As for the
accuracy, Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that two properties of IOs increase the quality
of information they provide: centralization and independence. Centralization enables
IOs to pool their resources and exploit the economies of scale. They can devote large
amounts of intellectual and physical resources in gathering and evaluating information.
Independence makes the information they provide more neutral especially vis a vis that
provided by national governments. As for the utility, IOs can gather information that
1
may be unacceptable if performed unilaterally. For instance, no government would
allow another national government to scrutinize their economy as much as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) does. Governments allow this because they
believe IOs are neutral and free from national biases. Therefore, the utility of the
information IOs provide can be higher than that provided by other institutions.
On the other hand, the comparative advantage in information gathering can be a
strategic resource for IOs and powerful members of the organization. IOs can hide
information that leads to questioning of their competence and disseminate false
information in order to preserve their power and prestige (Venzke, 2008; Vaubel, 1996).
Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland (2008) and Aldenhoff (2007) argue that to defend their
lending practices, the IMF provides overly optimistic forecasts to countries that are
under an IMF agreement and/or that have prolonged relationship with the Fund.
Further, powerful members of the IOs can use their influence over the organization to
pursue their private agendas. For instance, they can provide cheaper loans to their close
allies through the IMF if bilateral financial aid is domestically and internationally
controversial. IOs can selectively publicize information that is pleasant to the powerful
members which share the bigger burden of the cost of the organization. On this regard,
Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland (2008) and Aldenhoff (2007) show that the Fund
provides favorable forecasts to countries that are closely allied with the United States.
On one hand, some studies argue that IOs should be providing quality
information. On the other hand, some others argue that they sometimes disseminate
optimistic information that benefit themselves or their major shareholders. Given this
puzzle, my dissertation asks how other actors in the international system, specifically
2
investors and governments, respond to this information. Do investors respond
positively, or do they disregard it given that there are alternative information
providers? Do governments utilize favorable information for their electoral benefits? To
examine these questions, my dissertation looks at IMF macroeconomic forecasts. I
specifically look at IMF GDP growth and inflation forecasts as they provide valuable
information about a country’s economic conditions. Investors may use this information
to decide whether to invest into a country or to expand their existing investment. This
information is especially valuable for country’s where alternative information providers
are not very reliable. Governments may use this information when they plan their
spending budgets and pursue certain economic policies. And most important to
domestic politics, public can use IMF forecasts as an alternative to the information
provided by their governments.
This dissertation uses quantitative analyses to test these theories. In Chapter 2, I
compare the performance of IMF forecasts with that of three private forecasters in
predicting the sign, direction and magnitude of economic growth and inflation. The
analyses provide me with two important findings. First, overall private forecasts
perform better than the IMF forecasts. Second, private forecasts are also not free from
error and generally they err in the same direction with the IMF forecasts. Thus, I
conclude that studies on political economic determinants of IMF bias should compare
IMF forecasts with that of its competitors and not with the actual values.
Chapter 3 examines the characteristics of countries receiving optimistic IMF
forecasts. Earlier studies of IMF bias compare IMF forecasts with that of actual values.
This chapter differs from these studies in that, I measure forecast optimism as the
3
difference between IMF and private forecasts. I argue that IMF forecasts differ from the
private forecasts due to political and bureaucratic motivations. Powerful members of
the Fund use their influence at the organization to adjust the forecasts towards
optimism for their close allies. The IMF, as a bureaucratic institution, publishes
favorable forecasts to defend its lending and monitoring activities. I define these biases
as politically and bureaucratically motivated bias.1 The empirical analyses confirm
earlier studies and show that countries that share similar interest with the United States
and that have large outstanding debt to the Fund receive overly optimistic growth
forecasts. This effect was less pronounced in the inflation forecasts.
Chapter 4 examines how investors respond to the favorable IMF forecasts. I argue
that the sources of forecast optimism provide noneconomic information to the
investors. Politically and bureaucratically motivated bias signals about the Fund’s and
US commitment to help a country in times of economic difficulties. Politically
motivated bias also signals about long-term improvements in economic conditions and
investment climate. Therefore, rather than discounting the favorable information,
investors respond to them positively by taking higher risks and increasing investment. I
test my theory by examining the effect of biased IMF forecasts on foreign direct
investment inflows and sovereign bond spreads. The results show that investors
respond more positively to the IMF forecasts as they differ from private forecasts for
political and bureaucratic considerations.
1Forecast bias is defined as a systematic over or under prediction of a macroeconomic indicator of a
country or type of countries by a forecasting institution.
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In Chapter 5, I examine the effect of optimistic IMF forecasts on domestic politics.
Governments seeking reelection have powerful incentive to increase public spending
during election years. Therefore, I argue that favorable IMF forecasts help governments
to pursue expansionary policies, especially during election years. Optimistic forecasts
may also help governments to shed a positive light on the future. Thus, they may
increase their popularity. Through these direct and indirect mechanisms, I argue that
optimistic forecasts increase incumbent governments’ chances for reelection. The
analysis shows that government budget deficit increases following optimistic IMF
forecasts. Moreover, the results show that as optimism in IMF forecasts increases
incumbent government’s prospect for reelection increases.
This dissertation makes three contributions to the literature on international
organizations. First, IOs’ role as a quality information provider has been studied
extensively in the literature. Some scholars study how IOs help governments to make
credible commitments by making noncompliance more transparent.2 Others examine
how information from IOs increases cooperation.3 These studies generally do not test
the effect of information directly; they discuss and test the implications of that
information. This dissertation contributes to this literature by providing a direct
analysis of informational effects of International Organizations.
Second, my dissertation contributes to the public choice approaches to
international organizations. Previous studies have examined the characteristics of
countries that receive favorable forecasts, but have not analyzed how investors and
2See Simmons (2000); Fang and Owen (2011)
3See Fearon (1998); Dai (2005)
5
governments utilize these forecasts. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of
political economy of IMF forecasts by looking at how these forecasts are perceived by
some of the main actors. Finally, previous works on the IMF forecasts look at the
differences between IMF forecasts and actual values as a measurement of bias. Instead,
this dissertation suggests using the difference between IMF and private forecasts. I
believe this provides a better measurement of bias since it eliminates some forecast
errors that are common both in the IMF and private forecasts. This choice also enables
me to examine how investors and governments respond to the differences in the IMF
and private forecasts as they are available at the same time periods.
6
Chapter 2
Accuracy, Unbiasedness and Efficiency
of IMF and Private Forecasts
This dissertation examines the informational effects of International Organizations by
focusing on International Monetary Fund’s (IMF or Fund) forecasts in its World
Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. These reports are published biannually as a part
IMF’s surveillance activities where the IMF discusses global and national economic
trends, points out the weaknesses and alerts about the economic risks. WEO reports
also include IMF staff projections on several economic and financial indicators
including GDP growth and inflation.
The forecast of international organizations receive considerable coverage in the
media. However, there are also other institutions that publish forecasts on the same
economic indicators, including private sector forecasters and research institutes. Some
of them are on a more frequent basis than the IMF. Private sector, government agencies
and policymakers have been utilizing these forecasts in their decisions. In 1998, in his
7
address to New Zealand Society of Actuaries, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand Donald T Brash said:1
We do not ourselves make forecasts of the international economy, but
instead use the monthly Consensus Forecasts, produced by Consensus
Economics Inc. in London...We certainly have no reason to believe that we
could produce better forecasts for our overseas markets than can the
forecasters ‘on the ground’ in the countries concerned.
In this chapter, I compare the performance of IMF forecasts to those of three
private forecasters. I concentrate only on GDP growth and inflation forecasts as they
provide important information about a country’s economic conditions. These indicators
also attract more attention among the public as they are easier to interpret (Aldenhoff,
2007)
2.1 Previous Studies of Forecasts
There is an extensive literature in economics that explores the size, nature and
sources of forecast errors and compares the accuracy and efficiency of forecasts with
each other. In this section, I briefly discuss their arguments and findings.
The sources of forecast errors can be classified broadly into three categories. First,
there is uncertainty about the future. Forecasts are made on the basis of current and
announced policies; but we don’t know for certain how committed the governments are
to implement those policies. There are also uncertainties about the world economic
1The whole speech can be reached at “Reserve Bank forecasting: should we feel guilty?”
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situation. For instance, fluctuations in oil prices can affect the growth and inflation
rates or an economic crisis in a neighboring country may have unexpected spillover
effects. Thus, forecasters need to use their judgments about the consequences of the
current events and judgments are inherently open to errors. Even current-year forecast
for the Spring and Autumn from the same institution can sometimes substantially
differ from each other.
Information reduces uncertainty. Studies show that forecast errors decrease as the
time horizon shortens (Artis, 1996; Batchelor, 2001, 2007; Juhn and Loungani, 2002;
Abreu, 2011). Dovern and Weisser (2011) also show that dispersion among forecasts
decreases as forecast horizon decreases. Thus as the available information increases, the
forecasts become more accurate and differences among forecasters diminishes.
Moreover, forecasting macroeconomic indicators might be more difficult for
countries that face deep structural changes and that have high output volatility. Studies
show that there are regional differences in forecasting difficulty. Examining the
accuracy of private forecasts for 25 transition economies, Krkoska and Teksoz (2009)
show that forecast errors are largest for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
and smallest for Central Europe and the Baltic states (CEB) and forecast errors for
South-Eastern Europe (SEE) are somewhere in between.
The second source of forecast errors comes from behavioral biases. In this
category, the problem is not the availability of the information but how forecasters
utilize the information including their past forecasts errors and forecasts from other
institutions. Some researchers show that forecasters are slow to adopt to new
information such as a downward trend in economic growth (Batchelor and Dua, 1992;
9
Artis, 1996; Dovern and Weisser, 2011). Others find that forecasters overreact to the new
information and sometimes overcorrect their past errors (Ashiya, 2006).
There is also a tendency among forecasters to converge towards a consensus (Juhn
and Loungani, 2002; Glu¨ck and Schleicher, 2005). The reputational cost of being wrong
and alone is greater than the rewards of being right and alone. Thus, forecasters avoid
to be too different. On the other hand, the opposite is also true for some forecasters.
Frenkel, Ru¨lke and Zimmermann (2013) show that individual forecasters from
Consensus Economics anti-herd from forecasts of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the IMF.
Finally, forecasters may willfully introduce bias in response to political,
reputational and/or financial incentives. Some researchers have shown that forecasters
adopt consistently optimistic and pessimistic views. One of the reasons for this
behavior is to differentiate themselves from other products (Batchelor and Dua, 1992).
Some consumers of the forecasts might be interested in pessimistic or optimistic
forecasts in order to push for certain economic policies. Thus, forecasters may target
certain groups as consumers and blend their judgments accordingly. Also, forecasts
generally come with comments and policy recommendations. In order to maintain their
credibility forecasters may persist in their pessimistic or optimistic view for a while
(Batchelor, 2007). There is also the perception that good forecasts do not make frequent
changes (Batchelor and Dua, 1992). This makes forecasters more conservative in their
revisions.
Forecasts of national governments might be biased towards optimism for political
concerns. Optimistic forecasts can help governments to cast a favorable light on current
10
policies, or justify future course of action (Batchelor, 2007; Dovern and Weisser, 2011).
Estrin and Holmes (1990) argue that in 1980s French and Japanese governments used
optimistic forecasts in order to stimulate private investment. Similarly, Heinemann
(2006) show that Germany have based its budget plans on overly optimistic forecasts
for decades.
We also can not exclude political and reputational biases in the forecasts of
international organizations. First, bias in government forecasts might be transmitted to
the forecasts from these institutions during the technical adjustment process (Artis and
Marcellino, 2001). Second, influential members of the organizations may tamper with
the forecasts for their own benefit or for the benefit of their allies. Lastly, the
organizations may use optimistic or pessimistic forecasts to justify their positions on a
particular issue. Aldenhoff (2007) shows that long-term IMF forecasts of industrialized
countries are biased towards optimism and this optimism coincides with election years
for the United States. He also shows that IMF’s optimism for developing regions
correlates with increase in IMF loans to that region. Likewise, Dreher, Marchesi and
Vreeland (2008) show that IMF publishes optimistic forecasts for countries that vote in
line with the United States at the UN General Assembly and that have large
outstanding debt to the Fund.
Now, I will discuss the studies that examine the relative performance of forecasts
in terms of their accuracy and efficiency. Some researchers compare the forecasts from
international organizations. Artis and Marcellino (2001) examine IMF, OECD and EC
budget deficit forecasts for G-7 countries, and find that no single agency is best for all
countries, although some agencies perform well for certain countries. Pons (1999)
11
analyzes OECD and IMF forecasts and finds that OECD forecasts are slightly better
than the IMF forecasts.
There are also studies that compare forecasts of international organizations to
those of the private institutions. Comparing IMF, OECD and Consensus Economics
forecasts for G7 countries, Batchelor (2001) finds that Consensus Economics forecasts
perform better than the IO forecasts in 63 percent of the cases. Abreu (2011) studies EC,
IMF, OECD, Economist and Consensus Economics forecasts for 9 developed economies.
The results show that the accuracy of international organization and private forecasts is
similar. But, in most of the cases one of the international organizations, but not always
the same one, perform better than the private forecasts.
The findings on larger sample of countries are also similar. Timmermann (2007)
compares IMF and Consensus Economics forecasts in 23 advanced and emerging
economies. He finds that overall the performance of IMF forecasts is similar to that of
Consensus Economics forecasts. But, the findings are highly sensitive to the reference
month of the private forecasts. For instance, when we look at the April and September
forecasts, consensus forecasts perform better than the IMF in the majority of the cases.
Juhn and Loungani (2002) examine the forecasts of Consensus Economics and the IMF
in 63 developing countries. They find that Consensus forecasts perform slightly better
than the IMF forecasts in both developed and developing countries. The difference is
marginal for developed economies, but substantial in developing countries.
These studies compare forecasts of international organizations with Consensus
Economics forecasts. Consensus Economics takes the average of several private
forecasts, and thus does not give us an idea about how IO forecasts fair against
12
individual private forecasts. Krkoska and Teksoz (2009) analyze the performance of 13
intergovernmental and private forecasts (individual). They find that GDP growth
forecasts of EBRD, UN and the IMF are biased towards optimism, but EC and OECD
forecasts are unbiased. They also find that the forecasts of private institutions, except
Dun & Bradstreet are not biased. With respect to inflation forecasts, the difference
between intergovernmental organizations and private forecasts disappear. Only
forecasts of Economist Intelligence Unit and Global Insight among the private forecasts
continue to be unbiased.
The studies I have discussed in this section have shown that, overall, private
forecasts perform similar to the forecasts of international organizations. Private
forecasts, like the forecasts of the intergovernmental organizations, may deviate from
true expectations due to uncertainty about the future and behavioral bias. But, there is
also some evidence that private forecasts perform slightly better than the forecasts from
the international organizations.
2.2 Data
In this chapter, I examine the relative performance of forecasts from the IMF, and
three private institutions; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the Global Insight (GI),
and Business Monitor International (BMI). I concentrate only on economic growth and
inflation forecasters, because these macroeconomic indicators generally attract greater
attention among policymakers and the public, and thus more suitable to test my
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research questions (Aldenhoff, 2007). In the following chapters, I will discuss how the
public respond to these forecasts and how governments utilize this information.
The IMF forecasts are from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports which are
published biannually in the Spring and Autumn and which include two sets of
forecasts; current-year and next-year forecasts (IMF, 2002-2013). The IMF has been
publishing the WEO reports since 1993, but these reports started providing forecasts for
all member countries in 2002. Thus my data cover the period from 2002 to 2013. The
EIU forecasts are collected from EIU Country Reports; the GI forecasts are from Country
Monitor reports; and the BMI reports are from BMI regional monitor reports such as
Africa Monitor and Asia Monitor. These three private forecasts are published on a
monthly basis, and like the IMF reports, contain both current-year and next year
forecasts.
In order to investigate the relative performance of these forecasts, we first need to
establish a reference point. The Spring IMF WEO forecasts are published in April and
the Autumn forecasts in September (or October for some years). Thus, I take these
months as the reference points and only include the private forecasts that are published
in the same month of IMF publication. If the data were not available, I use the data
from the closest month preceding the IMF forecasts. With regard to the sample, the
EIU, GI and BMI data cover 99, 75 and 87 countries respectively. The IMF data cover
111 countries and include all countries covered by these three private forecasts. Next,
we need to decide which outcome data to be used to measure the forecast errors. The
conventional wisdom is to use the first available actualization values.2 Instead I utilize
2See Krkoska and Teksoz (2009); Abreu (2011)
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the latest GDP growth and inflation forecasts as they are provided by the World
Development Indicators dataset (WB, 2013). There are three reasons why I make this
choice. First, for some countries the actualization values in the next-year reports are not
the actual values but still estimates from that institutions. Thus, they might still contain
some kind of bias/error and this can complicate the comparison.
Second, until 2009 the IMF published GDP deflator values instead of consumer
prices for most of the advanced economies. The WDI data provide me with the
flexibility to solve this problem.3 Lastly, using next-year actualization values from EIU
and WEO reports provide similar results to those obtained by using the WDI data.4
Therefore, I use WDI data for the actualization values. I measure forecast errors as the
difference between the actualization values and the forecasts.5 I denote actualization
values as Xi,t where i indicates the country and t is the time period. Xi,t|t and Xi,t|t−1
denote current-year and next-year forecasts respectively. According to this notation, the
GDP growth forecast errors are calculated as below:
eSpringi,t = Xi,t|t − Xi,t (Spring current-year forecast error)
eSpringi,t−1 = Xi,t|t−1 − Xi,t (Spring next-year forecast error)
eAutumni,t = Xi,t|t − Xi,t (Autumn current-year forecast error)
eAutumni,t−1 = Xi,t|t−1 − Xi,t (Autumn next-year forecast error)
3I use GDP deflator form the WDI Database for years before 2009 and average inflation values after that.
As for private forecasts I use only average inflation.
4I do not report these analysis here, but I can provide them if requested.
5For both GDP growth forecasts and inflation forecasts positive numbers indicate optimism.
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And the inflation forecasts are measured as:
eSpringi,t = Xi,t − Xi,t|t (Spring current-year forecast error)
eSpringi,t−1 = Xi,t − Xi,t|t−1 (Spring next-year forecast error)
eAutumni,t = Xi,t − Xi,t|t (Autumn current-year forecast error)
eAutumni,t−1 = Xi,t − Xi,t|t−1 (Autumn next-year forecast error)
2.3 The Distribution of Forecast Errors
This section provides some summary statistics of the forecast errors. I use three
measurements which are commonly used in the literature.6 The first is the mean
absolute error (MAE) which is the arithmetic average of forecast errors over all years
and countries, disregarding the sign of error. The second measurement is the root mean
square error (RMSE) which is the square root of mean of the squared forecast errors.
RMSE =
√
1
n
n
∑
t=1
e2i,t
Finally, I look at the standard deviation (SD) of the errors. This measurement gives
information about the uncertainty around the forecasts (Abreu, 2011).
SD =
√
1
n− 1
n
∑
t=1
(ei,t − ei,t)2
6See Arora and Smyth (1990); Pons (1999); Abreu (2011)
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Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for GDP growth forecast errors. In the table,
the forecasting horizon increases from column 1 to 4, the first two columns displaying
the results for the current-year forecast errors. As in the previous studies, the findings
show that the MAE and RMSE increase as the forecasting horizon increases.7 Similarly
uncertainty, measured as standard deviation of forecast errors, increases with the time
length. This confirms earlier studies which argue that information decreases
uncertainty and therefore reduces forecast errors. Regarding the relative performance
of the forecasts, GI and EIU forecasts have smaller errors than the IMF forecasts, GI
having the smallest. This finding remains the same across all horizons. The results also
show that BMI forecasts are the least accurate one. The BMI data do not cover
developed economies which tend to have smaller forecasts errors. This might explain
why BMI forecasts perform differently from other private forecasts.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for GDP growth forecasts
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t e
Autumn
i,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
MAE
IMF 1.374 1.829 2.471 2.708
GI 1.225 1.637 2.242 2.416
EIU 1.348 1.782 2.321 2.597
BMI 1.861 2.308 2.848 3.003
RMSE
IMF 2.292 2.893 3.838 4.081
GI 2.144 2.618 3.408 3.661
EIU 2.313 2.709 3.533 3.923
BMI 2.835 3.418 4.253 4.494
SD
IMF 2.203 2.817 3.835 4.081
GI 2.085 2.569 3.409 3.663
EIU 2.239 2.608 3.524 3.915
BMI 2.732 3.341 4.244 4.486
7See Pons (1999); Timmermann (2007); Abreu (2011)
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Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for inflation forecast errors. Here, I do
not include BMI inflation forecasts because the measurement of inflation differs from
those of the IMF, GI and EIU.8 Similar to the findings in Table 2.2, RMSE, MAE and SD
of forecasts increase with increasing time horizon. As in the GDP growth forecasts,
private forecasts, the GI and EIU, perform better than the IMF forecasts. But overall the
difference between IMF and private forecast errors is larger in inflation forecasts.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for inflation forecasts
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t e
Autumn
i,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
MAE
IMF 0.955 1.712 2.744 2.887
GI 0.505 1.268 2.147 2.174
EIU 0.681 1.452 2.573 2.790
RMSE
IMF 1.899 3.116 4.600 5.012
GI 1.320 2.404 5.504 3.975
EIU 1.493 2.670 5.077 5.787
SD
IMF 1.899 3.084 4.523 4.788
GI 1.321 2.396 5.505 3.926
EIU 1.491 2.671 5.071 5.771
Next, I examine how forecasts perform in advanced and EME/Developing
economies. The intuition is that estimating macroeconomic indicators for advanced
economies should be easier as their economies are more stable and predictable
compared to developing economies. Thus, we should observe smaller forecast errors
and the differences among forecasters should be smaller. Table 2.3 presents the results.9
8BMI provides year-end inflation forecasts for some countries, while other forecasters publish average
inflation forecasts.
9Only 5% of the BMI data are for advanced economies. Therefore I didn’t include them in the analysis.
Also, as discussed before I didn’t include BMI inflation forecasts due to the measurement differences.
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Table 2.3: Forecast errors for advanced versus developing economies
Advanced EMEs and Developing
GDP growth Inflation GDP growth Inflation
MAE
IMF 2.045 1.192 2.899 3.393
GI 2.051 0.950 2.621 2.885
EIU 1.967 1.023 2.807 3.402
BMI 3.016
RMSE
IMF 2.981 1.712 4.347 5.633
GI 2.930 1.306 4.014 4.897
EIU 2.887 1.393 4.212 6.665
BMI 4.523
SD
IMF 2.931 1.646 4.336 5.346
GI 2.837 1.307 4.003 4.805
EIU 2.839 1.387 4.178 6.644
BMI 4.512
In the case of GDP growth, the forecasts perform similarly in advanced economies
while private forecast do slightly better in developing economies. BMI forecasts
perform worst even if the data is restricted to the EME/Developing economies. For
inflation forecasts, GI forecasts perform better than the IMF both in advanced and
developing economies. For developing economies, the EIU forecasts perform very
similar to the IMF forecast in terms of mean absolute error, but do worse in RMSE and
SD. RMSE and SD measurements are more susceptible to the outliers. This may explain
the variation in the EIU performance.
Finally, I examine how forecasts perform over the years. I concentrate only on
mean absolute errors of Spring current-year and next-year forecasts. Figure 2.1 displays
the results. First, overall forecasts perform very similarly, but the MAE of the forecasts
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Figure 2.1.: Mean absolute errors by year, 2002-2012
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are smallest for GI forecasts and biggest for BMI forecasts. Second, the graph on the
right panel shows a spike in 2008.10 This is expected since financial crises of 2007-2008
increased economic uncertainty and make forecasting more difficult. On the other
hand, the graph on the left panel does not show a similar pattern during financial
crisis. Thus, forecasts are better in predicting crisis in the current year but not in the
following year.
2.4 Accuracy of Forecasts
I have analyzed the MAE, RMSE, and SD of IMF and private forecasts. Although
these measurements give an idea about the distribution of forecast errors, they do not
10Next-year inflation forecasts show an increase in MAE in 2007 and 2008, but the spike is not as dramatic
as in the GDP growth forecasts.
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inform us about the overall direction of the forecasts. But more importantly, they do not
provide a statistical test for forecast accuracy.
In this section, I employ some statistical tests to analyze the accuracy of forecasts.
A forecast is accurate if it is unbiased and efficient. An unbiased forecast is one with
random forecast errors where the average of the forecasts errors sum up to zero
overtime. Holden and Peel (1990) suggest a simple test to examine forecast bias.
Basically, they suggest regressing forecast errors on a constant. The regression is
expressed as follow:
ei,t = µ+ ei,t
where ei,t is the forecast errors, µ is a constant, and ei,t is the error term. Forecasts are
unbiased, if µ is statistically significantly not different from zero.
Table 2.4 and 2.5 present the analysis for GDP growth and inflation forecasts. For
GDP growth, I control for the year[=2008] since Figure 2.1 shows a spike in mean
absolute errors in that year. In inflation analysis, I do not include crisis year as forecast
errors do not show the same pattern. As in the previous tables, the forecast horizon
increases from column 1 to 4. The results show that both IMF and private forecasts
show a pessimistic bias. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant. EIU
forecasts perform similar to the IMF forecasts, but slightly better. GI forecasts have the
smallest average error. As in the previous analysis, BMI forecasts has the highest
magnitude in negative bias. The coefficient of Year[=2008] is positive and statistically
significant indicating that all forecasters overpredict growth in the crisis year. In the
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Table 2.4: Unbiasedness, GDP growth forecasts
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t e
Autumn
i,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
IMF -0.707 -0.763 -0.754 -0.810
(0.056)*** (0.079)*** (0.101)*** (0.110)***
Year[=2008] 1.293 1.524 6.030 6.546
(0.186)*** (0.250)*** (0.317)*** (0.328)***
N of observations 1191 1086 1083 976
N of countries 111 111 111 111
GI -0.567 -0.600 -0.619 -0.547
(0.065)** (0.085)** (0.114)** (0.120)**
Year[=2008] 1.279 1.613 5.421 6.192
(0.215)** (0.282)** (0.353)** (0.376)**
N of observations 732 742 659 668
N of countries 76 75 76 75
EIU -0.698 -0.864 -0.754 -0.884
(0.057)** (0.077)** (0.103)** (0.111)**
Year[=2008] 1.228 1.712 5.123 6.319
(0.189)** (0.255)** (0.322)** (0.350)**
N of observations 1065 1066 968 968
N of countries 99 99 99 99
BMI -0.902 -0.848 -0.980 -1.068
(0.085)** (0.117)** (0.131)** (0.144)**
Year[=2008] 1.350 1.450 6.849 6.842
(0.276)** (0.364)** (0.399)** (0.418)**
N of observations 868 821 777 723
N of countries 87 87 87 87
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .05; **p< .01.
case of inflation, IMF and GI current-year forecasts in the Autumn are unbiased, but
they are biased towards optimism for all other forecasting horizons. EIU current year
forecasts are unbiased, while next-year forecasts show negative and statistically
significant bias. Overall, the results show that all forecasts are biased towards optimism
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Table 2.5: Unbiasedness, inflation forecasts
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t e
Autumn
i,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
IMF -0.098 0.413 0.811 1.340
(0.052) (0.087)** (0.134)** (0.130)**
N of observations 1150 1051 1052 946
N of countries 109 19 109 109
GI 0.002 0.155 0.390 0.678
(0.038) (0.078)* (0.124)* (0.128)**
N of observations 712 726 640 654
N of countries 76 76 76 75
EIU -0.061 0.027 0.435 0.697
(0.041) (0.070) (0.135)* (0.137)**
N of observations 1030 1030 938 937
N of countries 98 98 98 98
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .05; **p< .01.
in their next-year forecasts, while IMF forecasts are relatively more optimistic than the
other two private forecasts.
Next, I analyze how efficient the forecasts are in using all available information
during the time of forecasts. If forecasters are optimal in gathering and evaluating the
information, than there shouldn’t be any information in the past and current
information set that reduces forecast errors. Scholars have examined this aspect of
forecasts in several ways. Drechsel, Giesen and Lindner (2014) study how using some
common leading indicators, such as oil price, world trade, world-industrial production,
can improve forecast quality. Some others examine the forecast revisions (Ashiya, 2006;
Krkoska and Teksoz, 2009). Here I focus on the existence of serially correlated errors
23
Table 2.6: Forecast efficiency, GDP growth
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t
γ β γ β
IMF -0.430 0.206 -0.422 0.159
(0.058)** (0.025)** (0.081)** (0.027)**
GI -0.341 0.154 -0.369 0.145
(0.069)** (0.031)** (0.090)** (0.033)**
EIU -0.476 0.137 -0.588 0.164
(0.060)** (0.025)** (0.083)** (0.030)**
BMI -0.542 0.176 -0.476 0.232
(0.098)** (0.034)** (0.112)** (0.033)**
eAutumni,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
γ β γ β
IMF -0.044 0.205 0.165 0.081
(0.116) (0.030)** (0.134) (0.031)**
GI 0.053 0.173 0.120 0.135
(0.133) (0.038)** (0.144) (0.038)**
EIU -0.133 0.187 -0.161 0.178
(0.116) (0.032)** (0.130) (0.032)**
BMI -0.009 0.138 0.012 0.134
(0.162) (0.037)** (0.176) (0.038)**
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p< .05; ** p< .01.
and examine whether it would be possible to improve the forecasts by looking at the
past errors.11 To examine forecast efficiency I use the following equation:
ei,t = γ+ βei,t−1 + ei,t
11See Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland (2008); Abreu (2011) for similar analyses.
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Table 2.7: Forecast efficiency, inflation
eAutumni,t e
Spring
i,t
γ β γ β
IMF -0.040 -0.002 0.393 -0.008
(0.050) (0.025) (0.082)** (0.026)
GI -0.010 0.021 0.205 0.003
(0.053) (0.038) (0.081) (0.036)
EIU -0.0052 0.059 0.110 0.185
(0.034) (0.022)* (0.070) (0.026)**
eAutumni,t−1 e
Spring
i,t−1
γ β γ β
IMF 0.689 0.058 1.141 0.101
(0.131)** (0.029)* (0.141)** (0.031)**
GI 0.393 0.135 0.507 0.184
(0.128)** (0.022)** (0.130)** (0.032)**
EIU 0.453 0.105 0.504 0.428
(0.123)** (0.024)** (0.146)** (0.027)**
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p< .05; ** p< .01.
Where ei,t denote current-year forecast errors, ei,t−1 are the past year’s forecast errors,
and ei,t are the random errors. i and t denote the country and year respectively. If
β = 0, than it means that forecast errors are not serially correlated. And if both β = 0
and γ = 0, than it indicates that forecasts are efficient.12
Table 2.6 and 2.7 present the efficiency analysis for GDP growth and inflation
forecasts respectively. Regarding GDP growth forecasts, the results show that both IMF
12This is defined as “weak efficiency” requirement in the literature. See Krkoska and Teksoz (2009); Abreu
(2011).
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and private forecasts are inefficient for all forecast horizons. This means that the
forecasts could have been improved if past errors were taken into consideration. As for
inflation, the IMF forecasts are efficient for Autumn current-year forecasts. The GI
current-year forecasts in Autumn and Spring are efficient. On the other hand, the
evidence shows that all next-year inflation forecasts are inefficient.
The summary of this section is that both IMF and private forecasts show
pessimism in GDP growth and optimism in inflation forecasts. This supports
Batchelor’s (2001) argument that forecasts may consistently adopt optimistic and
pessimistic view. However, the GI and EIU forecasts perform slightly better than the
IMF forecasts. The results from the efficiency test clearly shows that all forecasters can
improve their forecasting performance by considering their past errors.
2.5 Directional accuracy of forecasts
Forecasts can provide valuable information even if they are inaccurate and/or
inefficient. They can provide information about the general outlook of the economy
such as acceleration or deceleration of growth. In this section I evaluate the
performance of forecasts in predicting the sign of change in GDP growth and inflation.
I use the following equations to measure the trend in growth and inflation:
∆Xi,t = Xi,t − Xi,t−1
∆X̂i,t = Xi,t|t−1 − Xi,t−1|t−1
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∆Xi,t is the actualization value of GDP growth (or inflation) in time t minus in
t− 1. ∆X̂i,t is the difference between next-year forecasts and current-year forecasts.
∆Xi,t > 0 and ∆X̂i,t > 0 indicate actual and predicted deceleration in growth (or
inflation) respectively.
I compared the sign of the change in actualization values and in forecasts using
contingency tables. Table 2.8 present the directional analysis. Overall, forecasts predict
the direction of change in approximately 60% of the cases. The success ratio is similar
across the forecasts, but EIU forecasts have a slightly higher success ratio. The
chi-squared independence tests confirm that there is a significant relationship between
the sign of change in actualization values and IMF Autumn forecasts. As for EIU the
association is significant for Autumn GDP growth forecasts and for both Autumn and
Spring inflation forecasts.
Table 2.8: Directional analysis
GDP Growth Inflation
Autumn Spring Autumn Spring
IMF 0.649 0.616 0.575 0.545
GI 0.631 0.614 0.624 0.619
EIU 0.670 0.627 0.602 0.583
BMI 0.600 0.596
Note: p-values above 0.05 are shaded in dark gray.
Finally, I examine the performance of forecasts in predicting the recessions.
Following Abreu (2011), I define recessions as the years in which there is a negative
GDP growth. I compared the recession years in the forecasts with those in the
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actualization values. Table 2.9 presents the years for all forecasting horizons.13 The
results shows that forecasters are better in predicting the recessions in the current year.
For instance the IMF and EIU predict approximately 50% of the cases. On the other
hand, forecasters do not perform well in predicting recession in the following year.
They predict at most about 11% of the cases.
Table 2.9: Forecast performance during recession
Current-year forecasts Next-year forecasts
Autumn Spring Autumn Spring
IMF 0.578 0.429 0.096 0.059
GI 0.427 0.378 0.075 0.029
EIU 0.548 0.449 0.111 0.059
BMI 0.301 0.204 0.022 0.022
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the relative performance of IMF, GI, EIU and BMI
forecasts. I analyze their success in predicting the level, direction, and sign of GDP
growth and inflation forecasts. I also investigate whether forecasters were optimal in
utilizing all available information during the time of forecasts.
In general, I find that forecast accuracy increases with decreasing forecast horizon.
Uncertainty, measured as the standard deviation of forecast errors, also decreases as the
time horizon shortens. Overall, IMF and private forecasts perform similarly; the GDP
13I analyze only GDP growth forecasts as negative values in inflation are very infrequent.
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growth forecasts from these institutions are pessimistic while inflation forecasts are
optimistic.
Regarding the accuracy of forecasts, the RMSE and MAE of private forecasts,
excluding the BMI, are smaller than the IMF forecasts. Statistical tests for unbiasedness
show that all GDP growth forecasts show negative bias while inflation forecasts are
biased towards optimism. On the other hand, GI and EIU forecasts have slightly
smaller average bias. As for the efficiency, both IMF and private forecasts fail to use all
available information. IMF and GI inflation forecasts are efficient in Autumn
current-year forecasts, the GI forecasts are also efficient in Spring current-year forecasts.
All forecasts fail to pass efficiency test in the next-year forecasts.
As for directional accuracy, forecasts perform similarly and predict approximately
60% of the cases. EIU forecasts slightly do better than the other forecasts. IMF and
private forecasts are also comparable in predicting recession, measured as negative
GDP growth. Forecasts are relatively successful in predicting recessions in the
current-year but not in the following year. Again, EIU forecasts are slightly better than
the other forecasts.
Overall, the analyses in this chapter show that private forecasts perform slightly
better than the IMF forecasts. Thus, it merits studying why IMF forecasts underperform
and examine whether political economy factors explain this difference. On the other
hand, the results show that private forecasts have similar accuracy problems and they
generally show the same direction of bias. Thus, studies of IMF bias that look at IMF vs
actual values are probably overstating the unique impact of the IMF on bias. Therefore,
in the following chapters I concentrate on the difference between IMF and private
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forecasts. In the next chapter, using the difference between IMF and private forecasts, I
will examine the characteristics of countries receiving optimistic IMF forecasts.
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Chapter 3
The political economy of IMF forecast
optimism: international organizations’
versus private analysts’ forecasts
In the previous chapter, I examine the accuracy and efficiency of IMF and private
forecasts. I aggregated forecast errors across years and countries to have a general look
at their performances. Overall, the results show that private forecasts perform relatively
better than the IMF forecasts. In this chapter I study the differences between IMF and
private forecasts more closely to understand the political economy of IMF optimism. I
show that IMF forecasts are more optimistic for countries that realign their foreign
policy preferences towards the United States and that have large outstanding debt to
the Fund. These findings lend support to the earlier studies which argue that
geopolitical and financial interests of the major shareholders of the Fund and the
Fund’s bureaucratic incentives to defend its lending activities lead to overly optimistic
IMF forecasts.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the literature on
IMF forecast bias. Section 2 presents the theory and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
data and method. Section 4 discusses the results, and a conclusion follows.
3.1 Sources of IMF Forecast Bias
Forecasts on macroeconomic and financial indicators of a country can be quite
different from their realization values. They may contain errors due to uncertainty
about the future; governments may change their economic policies or a random shock
to the world economy may change the expected economic outcomes (Pons, 1999). If
forecast errors only occur due to uncertainty about the future, they should add up to
zero overtime. However, errors of some forecasts do not show a random pattern, and
the cumulative forecast error is significantly different from zero. Earlier studies show
that IMF forecasts contain more errors than the forecasts of other IOs such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and both IOs have
larger forecast errors than private forecasts (Pons, 1999; Batchelor, 2001; Vaubel, 2009).
In the previous chapter, I revisit these studies and compare IMF forecasts with forecasts
from three private institutions. My results confirm earlier findings and show that
private forecasts perform slightly better than the IMF forecasts.
The literature provides two main explanations to this deviation (Dreher, Marchesi
and Vreeland, 2008; Aldenhoff, 2007). The first one is the influence of powerful member
countries. According to the literature these countries may use their influence over the
Fund either to pursue their geopolitical and financial interests by providing preferential
treatment to their close allies. The second explanation for this deviation is IMF’s
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bureaucratic incentives. The intuition is that the IMF, as any other bureaucratic
institution, is concerned about increasing its power and preserving its prestige and
reputation (Vaubel, 1996). Thus, it may pursue actions that would help furthering these
goals. They may provide optimistic forecasts to defend their lending activities or to
hide program failures.
There are a few studies that focus on the political economy of bias in IMF
forecasts, but there is extensive literature on bias in IMF lending activities. Following
Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland (2008), I assume that the factors that determine bias in
the IMF’s lending activities can also explain bias in the IMF forecasts. Therefore, in the
following section I will discuss the sources of bias in all IMF activities.
3.1.1 The Influence of Powerful Members
Members of IOs do not have equal powers in the decision making process. The
preferences of the powerful members weigh more than the preferences of the less
powerful ones. First, most of these organizations are initiated by a group of powerful
states and their organizational structures are shaped through negotiations among them.
Therefore, the formal structures of these organizations, to some degree, reflect the
distribution of power in the international system. Second, in order to ensure their
participation, IOs provide some informal rules to accommodate the interests of the
powerful members (Stone, 2011). Powerful members of IOs rarely practice these powers
in order not to diminish the legitimacy of the organization, but they use them when
they have high preference intensity (Copelovitch, 2010). Thus, even though IOs do not
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have formal rules that provide an advantage to the powerful members; informal rules
provide opportunities to influence the outcomes.
The IMF is no exception; it has both formal and informal rules that give powerful
members more leverage in affecting the outcomes. When discussing the influence of the
most powerful members over the Fund’s decisions, following other studies, I primarily
focus on the United States.1 One reason for this focus is that no other state comes close
to matching the US influence over the organization (McKeown, 2009).
Regarding the formal rules, each member of the IMF contributes a quota
subscription to the Fund proportional to their economic size. The quota shares then
determine the weight of votes for each country. The US has 17.70%, Japan 6.57%,
Germany 6.12%, and France and England 4.51% of the total quota shares. Thus, five of
the most powerful members of the Fund control approximately 46% of the votes.
Additionally, 85% of the votes is required to pass important Fund decisions. Thus
powerful members of the Fund, in cooperation with each other, can veto important
Fund decisions including the appointment of the managing director.2
Second, there are 24 members on the executive board of the IMF; eight of them are
appointed by the eight major share holders of the IMF while the other sixteen are
elected by groups of remaining countries (Barro and Lee, 2005).3 It is normal to expect
that governments’ representatives on the board of IMF serve in the best interests of
1See Thacker (1999); Barro and Lee (2005); Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland (2008)
2These decisions include revision of quota subscriptions, appointment of the managing director and his
deputy, the sale of IMF gold reserves, and amendments of the Articles of Agreement (Hexner, 1964). The
veto power of the Executive Board does not include IMF lending decisions; loan decisions only require a
simple majority (Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008)
3The eight major shareholders are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, China and Russia (Barro and Lee, 2005).
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their respective governments. On the other hand, the remaining members of the board
which represent 172 member countries can not exert the same influence over the Fund
unless every country in this group have a united voice. Moreover, the remaining sixteen
members of the executive board are subject to higher levels of turn-over compared to
the other eight members (Babb, 2003; Kwitney, 1983). Due to their short employment
on the board, these members may have less experience in communicating with the IMF
staff and influencing the Fund’s decisions.
The voting share and veto power of the US and other major shareholders may not
be decisive, since voting is not practiced frequently and countries rarely exercise their
veto power (Babb, 2003). The Fund prefers to make decisions on a consensus basis
(Mussa and Savastano, 2000). Moreover, the executive board is not directly involved in
the IMF’s lending and monitoring activities; the IMF staff designs programs and
negotiates them with the member countries. On the other hand, even if decisions are
made on a consensus basis, powerful countries may exert control over the decisions
through informal rules. The IMF staff works in the shadow of the executive board and
has to consider the preferences of the major shareholders (Copelovitch, 2010). For
instance, the US and French executive directors regularly interview with the IMF staff
before and after their missions to member countries. In some cases, such as Mexico,
Korea, and Argentina, the US treasury was directly involved in negotiations (Stone,
2011).
The IMF may also conform to the preferences of the US and other major
shareholders due to bureaucratic incentives. Fratianni and Pattison (1982) argue that
international institutions value self-preservation and the prestige of their institutions.
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Straying too far from the powerful members’ preferences may reduce prestige and
chances for self-preservation. Therefore, the IMF may respond to the preferences of the
US and major shareholders more attentively even though the formal structure of the
Fund has not provided more power to them.
Finally, many of the top staff members of the Fund are educated in the United
States and thus share similar economic views with those in the United States. This
provides a unique opportunity for the United States in terms of communicating and
making connections within the Fund. Moreover, the IMF headquarters in Washington
DC makes monitoring Fund activities much easier for the United States (Babb, 2007;
McKeown, 2009). McKeown’s (2009) study shows that the US evaluates its own
influence over IOs through its dominance in financing these institutions, in the
employment of US nationals or US educated/English-speaking individuals, and the
ability to monitor and communicate with the staff because of their presence in the
United States.
Empirical studies support the claims that powerful members of the IMF,
particularly the United States, influence the Fund’s decisions. Thacker (1999) shows
that US friends are more likely to receive loans from the IMF, especially for countries
that move politically closer to the United States. Dreher and Jensen (2007) find that
closer allies of the US receive fewer conditions for IMF loans, especially during election
times. Similarly, Barro and Lee (2005) find that governments closely allied with the
United States are more likely to get loans, and these loans are generally much larger.
Stone (2002, 2004) shows that countries allied with the US receive lighter punishments
when they do not comply with the IMF programs. Lastly, Dreher, Marchesi and
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Vreeland (2008) and Aldenhoff (2007) find that countries which are close allies of the
United States receive more favorable forecasts especially during election times.
3.1.2 IMF’s Bureaucratic Incentives
Countries delegate authority to the IMF, because it provides global public goods
of financial and monetary stability. However, the IMF may undermine the provision of
these public goods by providing preferential treatment to certain countries, especially
those who are closely allied with the major shareholders of the Fund. On the other
hand, even if all major shareholders’ preferences were in agreement, the existence of
multiple principals and a long chain of delegation would make it difficult to monitor
and motivate the Fund’s activities (Vaubel, 2006). Thus the Fund can enjoy some level
of autonomy.
Independence of the IMF from its principals might be a good thing, since this may
insulate the Fund from the political influence of the major shareholders. However, the
IMF as any other bureaucratic institution has its own preferences which are increasing
its prestige and power by expanding its budget, staff and independence (Vaubel, 2006;
Fratianni and Pattison, 1982). Vaubel (1991) shows that the IMF uses “hurry-up
lending” activities before a regular quota review in order to convince the members that
there is need for quota increase. The IMF staff members also do not want to be seen as
unsuccessful when they prescribe policy adjustments to borrowing countries and
monitor their compliance. They may extend loans to countries which have large
outstanding debt to the IMF and have payment difficulties (Dreher, Marchesi and
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Vreeland, 2008). Empirical studies support this argument, showing that countries that
borrow from the IMF are more likely to enter into IMF agreements in the future (Broz
and Hawes, 2006; Pop-Eleches, 2008).
To maximize its budget the IMF should also convince its shareholders that the
borrowing countries are creditworthy. Thus, the IMF may also engage in “defensive
forecasting” by providing optimistic forecasts for countries that are under IMF
arrangements (Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008). Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland
(2008) show that countries under IMF agreements receive overly optimistic forecasts.
Beach, Schavey and Isidro (1999) find that IMF forecasts errors increase as IMF funding
increases for that region. Similarly, Aldenhoff (2007) shows that IMF’s spring and
autumn forecasts for Asia and spring forecasts for Latin America are overly-optimistic
when IMF lending to these regions is the largest.
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses
As discussed, political and bureaucratic considerations can create incentives to
bias IMF forecasts. But why should the IMF risk its reputation as a quality information
provider and disseminate inaccurate information? The benefits of preferential
treatment in lending activities are tangible, and can outweigh the cost of occasional
deviations from the Fund’s original mandate. But, do really countries benefit from
optimistic forecasts?
One explanation is that the IMF publishes optimistic forecasts as an outcome of
favoritism in Fund’s other activities. We know from the literature that countries closely
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allied with the United States, receive larger loans with fewer conditionalities and these
countries are punished lightly for noncompliance.4 Optimistic forecasts may help the
IMF to justify these preferential treatments. We also know that the IMF provide loans to
countries that have difficulty in paying their earlier debts. This way, unpaid loans do
not show as a loss on their balance sheet (Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008). For
instance, in 2000 the IMF approved a three year Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with
Argentina and then they augmented the program by $6.5 billion in 2001, despite the
fact that Argentina was not complying with the IMF prescriptions. Later, the IMF was
criticized by the US for encouraging irresponsible behavior of Argentina (Damill,
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2006). The IMF may publish optimistic forecasts for these countries
in order to avoid criticisms, at least in the short-run. On the other hand, this does not
always mean that the Fund always consciously withhold information about these
countries. Some of the forecast bias might arise due to the Fund’s underestimation of
the country risks and overestimation of the positive economic effects.
Optimistic forecasts can also benefit the incumbent governments directly. In the
short-run, economic stabilization programs may generate hardship for the public.
Governments can use optimistic forecasts to gain support for certain economic reforms
or to reduce public concerns about its outcomes (Fratianni and Pattison, 1982). Further,
optimistic forecasts can help governments electorally (Aldenhoff, 2007; Dreher,
Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008). Incumbent governments have an incentive to increase
public spending and avoid necessary budget cuts during elections years. This way, they
hope to convince the public that the economy is doing well. Optimistic forecasts can
4See Thacker (1999); Barro and Lee (2005); Stone (2002)
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help governments to justify increasing spending during election years. Finally,
governments can use optimistic forecasts to portray the future in a positive light. Voters
will reward the incumbent government at the ballot box if they believe the economy
will do well in the future (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1996).
Therefore, I argue that powerful members of the Fund can use their influence at
the IMF to receive optimistic forecasts. Aldenhoff (2007) show that IMF forecasts for
G-7 countries are optimistic, and for the United States, this optimism is correlated with
elections years. Powerful members of the Fund can also reward foreign policy loyalties
by helping friendly governments to get favorable IMF forecasts, and thus help them
pass economic reforms or get reelected. Finally, major shareholders of the Fund can
defend their financial interests in another country with optimistic IMF forecasts,
especially if that country’s economy is fragile.
This chapter builds on Aldenhoff (2007) and Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland’s
(2008) studies, but differs from them in that it focuses on the deviation of IMF forecasts
from private forecasts rather than the actualization values. There are three reasons for
this choice. First, as shown in Chapter 2, although private forecasts perform slightly
better than the IMF forecasts, both IMF and private forecasts show similar errors. Thus,
a study of political economy of IMF forecasts should consider private sector forecast
errors as well. Second, both private and IMF forecasts are subject to the same random
external shocks. By taking their difference, I eliminate forecast errors that are caused by
random shocks.
Lastly, I utilize private forecasts as a benchmark for unbiasedness. Private sector
forecasters do not have political incentives to bias their forecasts because they are
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independent from policymakers. Therefore, Aldenhoff (2007) suggests that a
comparison of IMF forecasts with that of private sector can reveal the strategic behavior
in IMF forecasting. However, there might be institutional incentives; as discussed in
Chapter 2, private forecasters may avoid being too different or they may stick to their
earlier mistakes due to reputational concerns. On the other hand, the dual roles of the
Fund as the lending and monitoring agency opens doors to more serious institutional
incentives to bias the results.5 Thus relative to the IMF, I assume that private sector has
less institutional incentives for bias. I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Countries that have more formal power at the IMF are more likely to receive
optimistic forecasts.
Hypothesis 2: Countries that share similar interests with the United States are more likely to
receive optimistic forecasts, especially during election years.
Hypothesis 3: Countries that have high outstanding debt to the private banks from the
powerful members of the Fund are more likely to receive optimistic forecasts.
Hypothesis 4: Countries that have prolonged relationship with the Fund are more likely to
receive optimistic forecasts.
5On a similar note, Marchesi and Sabani (2007) argue that these dual roles of the Fund lead to unsatisfac-
tory implementation of the IMF programs.
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3.3 Data and Method
3.3.1 Method
The data has time-series-cross sectional (TSCS) structure covering up to
ninety-nine developed and developing countries from 2002 to 2012. The data is limited
to this period and sample due to data availability.6 The dependent variable, Forecast
optimism, is a continuous variable, thus requires a linear model. The Hausman test
indicate a significant difference between fixed and random effects specifications.
Therefore, to test the hypotheses I use OLS fixed effects model. To control for serial
correlation, I include lag of dependent variable. The full model testing the hypotheses
is as follows:
Forecast optimismi,t+1 = α+ Forecast optimismi,t + β1Actual Valuei,t
+ β2Hypothesesi,t + Countryi + Yeari + ei,t
Where ei,t denotes the IMF forecast optimism (either for GDP growth and inflation) for
a country i and in year t; α and ei,t are the constant and error terms. Actual Valuei,t
indicates the actualization value of the forecasted indicator in year t. Hypothesesi,t is the
vector of independent variables. Finally, I use multiple imputation to deal with the
missing values. I utilize the whole datasets in imputing the missing values, but use
only two variables from the imputed dataset in the final analysis. All coefficients and
standard errors are adjusted according to the variation across imputed datasets.
6IMF forecasts for the developing countries are available only after 2002. Also private forecasters do not
cover all the countries that the IMF covers.
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3.3.2 Data
The dependent variable, Forecast optimism, is measured as the difference between
IMF and private forecasts.7 IMF forecast are from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO)
reports which are published biannually in the Spring and Autumn. I concentrate only
on Spring next-year GDP growth and inflation forecasts. Because they have the longest
time horizon, and thus they are more open to discretionary forecasting.
I use two measurements of private forecasts; one takes Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) forecasts which are gathered from EIU Country Reports, the other takes the
average of EIU and Global Insight (GI) forecasts. The GI forecasts are from GI Country
Monitor reports.8 Both EIU and GI forecasts are published on a monthly basis. I use the
private forecasts that correspond the months the IMF forecasts are published. Forecast
optimism is calculated in a way that positive values indicate IMF optimism relative to
the private forecasts. I use the following equations to calculate Forecast optimism:
Forecast optimismGrowthi,t+1 = Forecast
IMF
i,t − ForecastEIUi,t
Forecast optimismInflationi,t+1 = Forecast
EIU
i,t − ForecastIMFi,t
Forecast optimismGrowthi,t+1 = Forecast
IMF
i,t − (
ForecastEIUi,t + Forecast
GI
i,t
2
)
Forecast optimismInflationi,t+1 = (
ForecastEIUi,t + Forecast
GI
i,t
2
)− ForecastIMFi,t
7This might be confusing as forecast optimism and bias are sometimes used interchangeably in the litera-
ture. I define forecast optimism as the difference between IMF and private forecasts. I use its interactions
with political and bureaucratic variables to define bias; either politically or bureaucratically motivated
bias.
8In the first chapter I examine three private forecasts; EIU, GI and BMI and compare their accuracy and
efficiency to the IMF forecasts. BMI forecasts were the least accurate one, therefore here I only include
EIU and GI forecasts. For more detailed discussion of the forecast data please look at the data section of
chapter 2.
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I have two sets of independent variables. The first set is related to politically
strategic motivations in IMF forecasting. A country’s formal powers at the IMF
increases with its economic size. Therefore, I measure a country’s influence at the Fund
with the log of Total GDP. To measure the financial interests of the powerful members
of the Fund, I include a country’s Arrears on private debt (as a % of GDP) as suggested
by (Gould, 2003). Both Total GDP and Arrears on private debt are from World Bank (WDI)
database (WB, 2013).
Political interest is measured by a country’s Political affinity to the United States.9
This measurement is based on a country’s voting similarity with the United States at
the UN General Assembly, but uses a distance-based measure to calculate the
preference similarity. The data range from -1 to 1, 1 being the most similar interests. I
also include a country’s UN voting similarity with the US as an alternative
measurement. The data are form Strezhnev (2013). Lastly, I interact Political affinity with
Elections to examine whether US allies receive more favorable forecast during election
years. The Elections data include both executive and legislative elections and are from
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001).
The second set of variables focus on the Fund’s bureaucratic incentives. The
primary measurement is the log of a country’s Use of IMF credit. The data are from WDI
Database. As an alternative measurement, I include IMF arrangements. This variable is
coded as 1 if a country is under an IMF agreement for at least 5 months in a particular
year, and 0 otherwise. The data are from Dreher (2006). I supplemented the data for the
9Copelovitch (2010) concentrates on the largest five shareholders of the Fund, but most studies focus only
on the United States (see Thacker, 1999; Barro and Lee, 2005).
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years 2012 and 2013 from IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA)
database.10
IMF forecasts can deviate from the actualization values due to Fund’s financial
stability concerns. During financial distress, pessimistic forecasts may trigger or
exacerbate capital flight. Thus, the IMF might be overcautious in assessing these
countries’ economies to avoid worsening of the situation. I include two variables, to
control for this effect. Short-term debt, which is a country’s debt that has a maturity of
one year or less as a ratio of GDP, controls for a country’s liquidity problems. The data
are from WDI Database. Exchange rate regime controls for a country’s vulnerability to
the inflation fluctuations. This variable is a five-point index which goes from fixed to
floating exchange rate systems. The data are from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
and cover the years from 2002 to 2010. This variable is included only in the inflation
analysis.
I expect forecast optimism to increase with the magnitude of the actual values.
For instance, we should see more difference between IMF and private forecasts in high
levels of inflation. Therefore, I include the actual values of GDP growth and inflation to
control for this effect. The data are from WEO Database.11
10http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona/index.aspx
11See Table 3.5 in the Appendix for the summary statistics of the data.
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3.4 Results
Table 3.1 presents the results for GDP growth forecasts.1213 Model 1 is the basic
model in which a country’s economic size, measured as total GDP, is the only main
explanatory variable. Contrary to my expectation, the effect of Total GDP is negative
and statistically significant. Thus, this result does not lend support to Hypotheses 1
which argues that influential members of the IMF receive more optimistic forecasts.
The coefficient of GDP growth is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the
difference between IMF and private forecasts increases with the magnitude of the
forecasted variable. Short-term debt is positively correlated with forecast optimism as
expected, but does not reach statistical significance. The findings on these variables
remain similar across all models.
Model 2 adds political and financial considerations of Fund’s influential members.
The effect of Political affinity is positive and statistically significant, meaning that
countries that share similar interests with the United States receive favorable IMF
forecasts. 0.5 unit increase in the affinity score increases forecast optimism by
approximately 0.8 point. The coefficient of Arrears on private debt is positive as expected,
but fails to achieve statistical significance.
In Model 3, I include the interaction between affinity and Elections to examine
whether close allies of the US receive more favorable forecasts during election years.
The coefficient of the interaction term is negative contrary to my expectation, but fails
to achieve statistical significance. I do not include elections in the following models.
12Outliers were diagnosed by using Cook’s distance test and eliminated from the analyses.
13I also tested the hypotheses one at a time. Please see the Appendix for the results.
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Table 3.1: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. EIU GDP growth forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Forecast optimismt−1 0.017 −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
GDP growth 0.066 0.086 0.090 0.087 0.086
(0.014) ∗ ∗∗ (0.015) ∗ ∗∗ (0.015) ∗ ∗∗ (0.015) ∗ ∗∗ (0.014) ∗ ∗∗
Total GDP (log) −0.309 −0.548 −0.576 −0.615 −0.505
(0.163)∗ (0.172) ∗ ∗∗ (0.174) ∗ ∗∗ (0.178) ∗ ∗∗ (0.174) ∗ ∗∗
Political affinity 1.664 1.789 1.479
(0.389) ∗ ∗∗ (0.410) ∗ ∗∗ (0.406) ∗ ∗∗
Arrears on private debt 0.032 0.021 0.022 0.019
(0.075) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074)
UN voting 3.497
(0.934) ∗ ∗∗
Use of IMF credit (log) 0.112
(0.071)
IMF arrangements 0.336
(0.178)∗
Short-term debt 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Elections −0.167
(0.161)
Political affinity −0.090
× Elections (0.281)
Number of observations 879 879 870 879 879
Number of countries 99 99 98 99 99
R-squared 0.448 0.354 0.357 0.356 0.356
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
Model 4 adds Use of IMF credit to Model 2 to test whether IMF’s bureaucratic incentives
have an effect on IMF optimism. Although the effect is in the expected direction, it is
not significant. Model 5 replaces affinity score and Use of IMF credit with UN voting and
IMF arrangements variables. The effect of both variables are in the expected direction
and statistically significant.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. EIU inflation forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Forecast optimismt−1 0.451 0.460 0.462 0.460 0.461
(0.030) ∗ ∗∗ (0.019) ∗ ∗∗ (0.019) ∗ ∗∗ (0.019) ∗ ∗∗ (0.019) ∗ ∗∗
Inflation 0.108 0.138 0.132 0.135 0.137
(0.032) ∗ ∗∗ (0.026) ∗ ∗∗ (0.023) ∗ ∗∗ (0.023) ∗ ∗∗ (0.023) ∗ ∗∗
Total GDP (log) −0.145 −0.161 −0.104 −0.192 −0.179
(0.367) (0.287) (0.278) (0.284) (0.281)
Political affinity 1.028 0.950 0.978
(0.597)∗ (0.626) (0.622)
Arrears on private debt 0.115 0.127 0.112 0.103
(0.103) (0.106) (0.104) (0.103)
Short-term debt 0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
UN voting 2.646
(1.444)∗
IMF arrangements 0.225
(0.286)
Use of IMF credit 0.032
(0.112)
Exchange rate system −0.049
(0.034)
Elections 0.005
(0.253)
Political affinity −0.148
× Elections (0.441)
Number of observations 672 872 863 872 872
Number of countries 97 99 98 99 99
R-squared 0.677 0.648 0.649 0.648 0.648
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
The coefficient of Forecast optimism is positive and statistically significant in all
models, suggesting that the direction of IMF inflation forecast optimism persists over
the years. Inflation is positively and statistically significantly associated with IMF
optimism. As in the GDP growth forecast analysis, this suggests that the level of
optimism is correlated with the magnitude of the forecasted variable. The results
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provide some support for Hypothesis 2. The effect of Political affinity is positive and
significant in Model 2, but fails to achieve statistical significance in other models. The
alternative measurement, UN voting is positively and statistically significantly
associated with inflation forecast optimism. The results do not lend support for the rest
of the hypotheses.
Table 3.3: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. average private growth forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IMF forecast optimismt−1 −0.082 −0.094 −0.097 −0.100 −0.105
(0.041) ∗ ∗ (0.041) ∗ ∗ (0.040) ∗ ∗ (0.041) ∗ ∗ (0.041) ∗ ∗
GDP growth 0.034 0.044 0.044 0.047 0.046
(0.012) (0.013) ∗ ∗∗ (0.013) ∗ ∗∗ (0.012) ∗ ∗∗ (0.013) ∗ ∗∗
Total GDP (log) −0.271 −0.334 −0.335 −0.435 −0.258
(0.138)∗ (0.148) ∗ ∗ (0.149) ∗ ∗ (0.154) ∗ ∗∗ (0.152)∗
Political affinity 0.658 0.662 0.506
(0.306) ∗ ∗ (0.318) ∗ ∗ (0.312)∗
Arrears on private debt 0.109 0.110 0.096 0.098
(0.053) ∗ ∗ (0.053) ∗ ∗ (0.053)∗ (0.053)∗
UN voting 2.646
(1.444)∗
Use of IMF credit (log) 0.137
(0.058) ∗ ∗
IMF arrangements 0.485
(0.168) ∗ ∗∗
Short-term debt 0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Elections −0.094
(0.118)
Political affinity 0.038
× Elections (0.217)
Number of observations 601 601 601 601 601
Number of countries 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.378 0.390 0.393 0.396 0.399
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
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Table 3.3 and 3.4 presents the robustness tests on my results. In this analysis, I
take the difference between IMF forecasts and the arithmetic average of two private
forecasts (EIU and GI). The intuition is that an individual private forecast may deviate
from the actual values due to behavioral and/or technical biases. Therefore, the average
of private forecasts may give a better assessment of the available information. Thus,
comparing IMF forecasts to the average private forecasts is more ideal to understand
politically and bureaucratically motivated adjustments in IMF forecasts. The only
problem with this choice is that it substantially reduces my sample due to the
availability of GI forecasts.
As for GDP forecasts, the results remain similar to those of Table 3.1. But there are
some differences that are worth mentioning. In Table 3.3, the coefficient of Forecast
optimism is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the IMF over corrects
past errors. The results also provide stronger support for bureaucratically adjusted
forecasts. The effect of Use of IMF credit and IMF arrangements are both positive and
statistically significant. The effect of Arrears on private debt is positive as before, but
reaches to statistically significance, lending support to Hypothesis 3 which argues that
forecasts are adjusted due to financial interests of the powerful members. As for
inflation, the results confirm those of Table 3.4. There is some support for politically
adjusted forecasts. The coefficient of Arrears on private debt becomes statistically
significant and remains so in all models. But, the results do not lend support for the
remaining hypotheses.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. average private inflation forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Forecast optimismt−1 0.448 0.448 0.449 0.447 0.448
(0.030) ∗ ∗∗ (0.025) ∗ ∗∗ (0.025) ∗ ∗∗ (0.025) ∗ ∗∗ (0.026) ∗ ∗∗
Inflation 0.110 0.102 0.106 0.102 0.106
(0.032) ∗ ∗∗ (0.026) ∗ ∗∗ (0.027) ∗ ∗∗ (0.026) ∗ ∗∗ (0.027) ∗ ∗∗
Total GDP (log) −0.173 −0.221 −0.219 −0.275 −0.267
(0.367) (0.280) (0.280) (0.292) (0.289)
Political affinity 0.845 0.927 0.762
(0.534) (0.553)∗ (0.549)
Arrears on private debt 0.191 0.184 0.200
(0.101)∗ (0.100)∗ (0.103)∗
Short-term debt 0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
UN voting 2.72
(1.306) ∗ ∗
IMF arrangements 0.221
(0.309)
Use of IMF credit 0.069
(0.106)
Exchange rate system −0.236
(0.345)
Elections 0.093
(0.213)
Political affinity −0.279
× Elections (0.393)
Number of observations 471 599 599 599 599
Number of countries 69 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.677 0.659 0.661 0.663 0.660
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I revisit earlier studies that examine the political economy of IMF
forecasts. But instead of measuring forecasts errors as the difference between IMF
forecasts and actualization values, I compare IMF and private forecasts.
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The results mostly confirm earlier findings. I find strong support for politically
adjusted forecasts in GDP growth forecasts and a limited one in the inflation forecasts.
The results show that countries that share similar interests with the United States
receive optimistic forecasts. I also show that countries that are heavily indebted to
private banks from powerful members of the Fund receive favorable forecasts,
suggesting that these countries use their influence at the Fund to defend their financial
interests in the host country. The analysis on GDP growth provide support for
bureaucratically adjusted forecasts. The IMF GDP growth forecasts are more optimistic
for countries that are under an IMF program or that have large outstanding debt to the
Fund. However, I do not find the same pattern in the inflation forecasts.
Overall, this chapter shows that IMF forecasts are systematically more optimistic
than the private forecasts for certain countries. This finding is important given that one
of most important function of the Fund is to monitor member countries’ economic
performances. So now the question is how other actors in the international system,
such as market forces and governments, respond to this information. In the following
chapter, I will examine how investors respond to the IMF forecasts as they differ from
those of private firms and ask whether investors discount this information or utilize it
in their investment decisions as it may contain some non-economic information.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.5: Summary statistics, Forecast optimism
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP growth forecast optimism 0.199 1.488 −7.800 21.300
Inflation forecast optimism 0.531 4.57 −14.900 105.700
GDP growth forecast optimism 0.055 1.062 −3.850 12.900
Inflation forecast optimism 0.406 3.36 −13.050 61.150
Total GDP (log) 24.86 1.876 20.360 29.74
GDP growth 4.227 5.109 −62.080 104.500
Inflation 7.235 16.108 −9.863 325.000
Political affinity −0.437 0.362 −0.938 0.962
UN voting 0.337 0.153 0.088 0.941
Arrears on private debt 0.750 1.444 0.000 19.780
Use of IMF credit (log) 11.41 9.781 0.000 24.09
Short-term debt (% GDP) 8.296 7.081 0.000 55.590
Exchange rate system 2.037 0.97 1 5
Notes. Forecast optimisms in bold text utilize average private forecasts
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Table 3.6: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. EIU GDP growth forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Forecast optimismt−1 0.006 0.017 0.007 0.012 0.013
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
GDP growth 0.089 0.072 0.087 0.077 0.074
(0.015) ∗ ∗∗ (0.014) ∗ ∗∗ (0.015) ∗ ∗∗ (0.014) ∗ ∗∗ (0.014) ∗ ∗∗
Short-term debt 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.009
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Political affinity 1.195
(0.367) ∗ ∗∗
Arrears on private debt 0.060
(0.077)
UN voting 2.545
(0.869) ∗ ∗∗
Use of IMF credit (log) 0.131
(0.064) ∗ ∗
IMF arrangements 0.448
(0.177) ∗ ∗
Number of observations 887 887 887 887 887
Number of countries 99 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.331 0.321 0.328 0.320 0.325
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of IMF optimism; IMF vs. EIU inflation forecasts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Forecast optimismt−1 0.467 0.464 0.466 0.468 0.468
(0.018) ∗ ∗∗ (0.018) ∗ ∗∗ (0.018) ∗ ∗∗ (0.018) ∗ ∗∗ (0.018) ∗ ∗∗
Inflation 0.131 0.126 0.132 0.127 0.127
(0.022) ∗ ∗∗ (0.022) ∗ ∗∗ (0.023) ∗ ∗∗ (0.022) ∗ ∗∗ (0.022) ∗ ∗∗
Short-term debt −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Political affinity 0.885
(0.537)∗
Arrears on private debt 0.118
(0.102)
UN voting 2.354
(1.275)∗
Use of IMF credit 0.080
(0.099)
IMF arrangements 0.324
(0.279)
Number of observations 880 880 880 880 880
Number of countries 99 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.646 0.647 0.646 0.646 0.646
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p< .1; ** p< .05; *** p< .01.
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Chapter 4
The Effect of IMF Forecasts on Investors’
Behavior
Previous chapter shows that the Fund provides optimistic forecasts to countries that are
closely allied with the United States and/or that have a prolonged relationship with the
Fund. In this chapter, I examine how investors respond to these favorable forecasts,
given that private forecasters provide similar, but more accurate information. I argue
that the sources of forecast optimism provide additional non-economic information to
the investors and investors respond to this information accordingly. Defensive
forecasting signals about the Fund’s commitment to help a country with balance of
payment difficulties. Forecast bias due to US influence reinforces these expectations but
it also suggests long-term improvement of economic conditions and investment climate.
Employing a fixed effects model for eighty-six emerging and developing economies
from 2002 and 2012, this chapter shows that the marginal effect of forecasts on FDI
inflows increases with politically motivated bias. Sovereign spreads markets respond
positively both to the politically and bureaucratically motivated bias.
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The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the theory and
hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data and method. Section 3 presents the results and
a brief conclusion follows.
4.1 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, I theorize that forecast bias provide new information to the
investors. Before outlining my theory, I briefly discuss how IMF forecasts might
provide additional information beyond that of private forecasts.
IMF forecasts provide valuable information to the market if they reflect the
objective condition of the economy. The IMF has extensive resources and can exploit
the economies of scale in gathering information about member countries. This is
especially important for developing countries where there are some concerns about the
quality of information provided by domestic institutions. Moreover, Private forecasters
and rating agencies may not have enough resources in these countries to fully evaluate
the economic conditions, and therefore they may prefer to be conservative in their
forecasts.1 Thus IMF may have special information on the economies of these countries
which could be conveyed through the macroeconomic forecasts.
Additionally, investors consider the political situation as well as macroeconomic
fundamentals when they invest in a foreign country. The democracy level of a regime
and a governments’ commitment to property rights increases FDI inflows (Li and
1Ferri (2004) argues that rating agencies underinvest in developing countries. Increasing efforts from
these agencies lead to increases in ratings of non-OECD countries, proving that these agencies have lower
investment capacities in developing countries.
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Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2008). Regarding sovereign credit markets, scholars argue that
not only governments’ ability to pay their debts but also their willingness to pay is
important in calculating the default risk of a country (Cantor and Packer, 1995; Larraı´n,
Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1997). Thus, politics matter to the investors and perhaps it
matters more in the cases of developing countries where there is more uncertainty.
Mosley (2003) argues that for “good credit risk” countries, investors look at broad
economic indicators such as inflation and budget deficit. On the other hand, investors
consider a wide range of country specific information for “bad credit risk” countries.
Biased forecasts may include some information other than what the forecast indicator
actually measures that would be useful for the investors. For example investors may
not take favorable inflation forecasts at face value, but as an indicator of IMF’s trust in
the government’s management of the economy.
Thus, by publishing favorable forecasts, the IMF may provide some additional
information about member countries’ political and economic climates or the Fund’s
resolve to help these countries in difficult economic conditions. There are a few studies
which examine the political economy of IMF forecasts. Their findings show that IMF
forecasts are biased due to US influence and the Fund’s bureaucratic incentives (Dreher,
Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008; Aldenhoff, 2007). However, to my knowledge, there are
no studies that analyze the effect of biased forecasts on investors. The closest to this
project is Fratzscher and Reynaud’s (2011) work which analyzes the effect of the IMF’s
Public Information Notice (PIN) releases on financial markets.2 They find that financial
2The IMF issues PINs after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with member coun-
tries. These reports assess member countries’ economic and financial policies and long-term program
engagements.
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markets react more positively to PIN releases for the countries that have political
influence at the IMF. However, they do not examine the mechanisms or the causes of
this effect. This chapter fills the gap in this literature by analyzing the effect of biased
forecasts on investors. To do so, I differentiate forecast biases according to their sources:
bias due to the US influence and bias due to the IMF’s bureaucratic incentives.
The two sources of bias can have different effects on investors. First, forecast bias
due to US influence indicates a country’s geopolitical and financial importance to the
United States. Since the United States is concerned about the political and economic
stability of these countries, forecast bias strengthens the idea that the US will pressure
the Fund to support these countries during bad economic times. Previous scholarship
on IMF shows that the United States uses its influence over the Fund to provide larger
loans to its allies (Thacker, 1999; Copelovitch, 2010). US allies also receive fewer
conditionalities and they are punished lightly for noncompliance (Dreher and Jensen,
2007; Stone, 2002, 2004). Stone (2011) finds that IMF loans are larger for US allies,
especially if they are vulnerable to sudden reversals of international capital flows.
The possibility of financial support from the IMF may have positive effects on
sovereign credit markets.3 Investors may increase lending to high risk countries if they
believe that the United States will intervene and bail them out through the IMF. For less
mobile capital markets, long-term economic conditions are more important.
Preferential treatment from the IMF due to the political closeness to the United States
may indicate long-term improvements in economic conditions such as an increase in
3(Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody, 2006) show that spreads on bonds are lower for countries that are under
IMF programs.
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trade volume and economic cooperation. Studies show that countries that have similar
national preferences and that have peacefull relationships have higher levels of trade
(Gartzke, 1998; Pollins, 1989; Dixon and Moon, 1993). The United States also sometimes
pursue bilateral and regional trade agreements to reward foreign policy loyalties, to
solidify partnership or to encourage further democratization and liberalization
(Feinberg, 2003; Rosen, 2004). These agreements provide each country with market
access and create more stable and transparent investment environment. Hence, they
increase FDI inflows (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008).
Moreover, previous studies of US foreign trade have shown that political and
strategic considerations are important determinants of aid allocations (Alesina and
Dollar, 2000). Thus, favorable IMF forecasts due to US influence may indicate that the
country will receive aid from the United States. Foreign aid improves the investment
environment by having a positive effect on economic growth and human capital or by
decreasing investment risk.4 Hansen and Tarp (2001) show that increased aid flows are
associated with increased investment for most of the receiver countries. The United
States also encourages investment in allied countries by providing insurance to the
investors through Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). For example, OPIC
allocated $2 billion to support private investment in the Middle East and North African
region in order to encourage private investment and help peaceful transformation of
the region after the Arab uprisings.5 To summarize, having close relationship with the
4For foreign aid’s effect on economic growth and human capital see Kosack and Tobin (2006) for invest-
ment risk see Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa (2009).
5Letter from the President, OPIC 2011 Annual Report
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United States may provide a country with some economic advantages and preferential
treatment from the IMF due to US influence may reinforce these expectations.
A country’s political and financial importance to the United States is generally
known by the market. It’s not the political closeness, but the United States’ willingness
to use its influence over the Fund that signals new information to the investors. As
discussed earlier, powerful members of international organizations refrain from using
their influence over the IOs frequently because it may decrease the legitimacy of the
organization. Thus, by providing a favorable forecast, the United States is sending a
costly signal to the investors. Moreover, favorable forecasts may indicate particularly
good relationship between the United States and the incumbent government. Therefore,
I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: FDI will respond more favorably to IMF forecasts if they are biased due to
political proximity to the United States.
Hypothesis 2: Sovereign credit markets will respond more favorably to IMF forecasts if they are
biased due to political proximity to the United States.
Forecast bias due to bureaucratic incentives signals investors about the Fund’s
commitment to help that country with payment problems. This may create moral
hazard problems and encourage investors to take higher risks. Haldane and Scheibe
(2004) show that around IMF bail-out times, creditor banks’ share prices increases
significantly. The effect is especially substantial when the IMF announces larger loans.
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Similarly, Lee and Shin (2008) show that as the likelihood of IMF lending for a country
increases the relationship between sovereign spreads and economic fundamentals
decreases, thus suggesting that creditors are more likely to take risks when IMF is
involved. Although other scholars find mixed empirical support for the moral hazard
argument, taken together these results show that the safety net IMF provides increases
moral hazard problems.6
I argue that international creditors will respond to optimistic forecasts favorably if
they are adjusted bureaucratically. This bias signal investors that IMF will support that
country with balance of payment difficulties. I do not expect a similar relationship
between FDI inflows and bias. Foreign direct investors are more likely to be concerned
about the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country. They may not see IMF
involvement as a sign of progress, but rather as a sign of weakness. Jensen (2004) find
that a country that participate in IMF agreement receives 25% less FDI inflows than a
country that does not participate. Therefore, I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: FDI will respond less favorably to IMF forecasts if they are biased due to the
Fund’s bureaucratic incentives.
Hypothesis 4: Sovereign credit markets will respond more favorably to IMF forecasts if they are
biased due to the Fund’s bureaucratic incentives.
6There are also studies that find no support for this argument. Lane and Phillips (2000) find that few of
the IMF interventions in 1990s led to significance decrease in spreads on bonds. Similarly Kamin (2004)
find little support for moral hazard argument after 1998.
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4.2 Data and Method
4.2.1 Method
I examine the effect of optimistic IMF forecasts on two variables; FDI inflows and
sovereign bond spreads. The data on FDI inflows have time-series-cross sectional
(TSCS) structure covering up to eighty-six emerging and developing countries from
2002 to 2012.7 Because of the data structure, I expect some heterogeneity across
countries and years; the dependent variable, FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, is a
continuous variable. Therefore, to test the hypotheses I employ an OLS model with
fixed effects specification. I also include the lag of dependent variable to control for
serial correlation.
Sovereign bond spreads analysis covers up to sixteen emerging economies from
2002 to 2012.8 I take the natural log of sovereign spreads to have a normally distributed
dependent variable which is a common practice in the literature.9 As in the FDI
analysis, I employ a fixed effects model with country and year effects. Both for FDI and
sovereign spreads, I lagged all control variables by one year to control for reverse
causality.10
I assume that IMF forecasts on emerging and developing economies are more
relevant for the investors. First, because investors show concerns about the quality and
availability of information provided by their governments and there is some evidence
7See Table 4.3 in the Appendix for the list of the countries
8See Table 4.3 in the Appendix for the list of the countries. The countries in bold character are included
in the sovereign spreads analysis.
9See Cantor and Packer (1997); Min et al. (2003)
10Outliers and influence points are identified using Cook’s distance and removed from the analyses.
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that private information providers underinvest in these countries (Mosley, 2003; Ferri,
2004) Second, advanced economies rarely need financial support from the IMF.11 Thus,
it is safe to assume that investors are less attentive to IMF information on these
countries. Hence, the analyses in this section concentrate on only emerging and
developing countries.
4.2.2 The Data
The first dependent variable, FDI inflows, is measured by foreign direct
investment inflows (% GDP) into a country each year. The data are from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The second dependent variable,
sovereign bond spreads, is calculated as the premium paid by an emerging market over
a US government bond. The data on yields are from JP Morgan’s Government Bond
Index-Emerging Markets (GBI-EM) indices. The data are quarterly; I use the second
and fourth quarter values which correspond to the periods in which the IMF publishes
its inflation and GDP growth forecasts.
The main independent variables for both analyses are; IMF inflation and GDP
growth forecasts and their interactions with politically and bureaucratically motivated
bias.12 The IMF forecasts are collected from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO)
reports. These reports are published biannually and include four types of forecasts:
Spring forecasts for the current and the following year, and Fall forecasts for the current
11It is only very recently that some advanced economies such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus
entered into agreements with the IMF.
12Politically and bureaucratically motivated bias are two-way interactions between forecast optimism and
political/bureaucratic variables. Thus, in practice, I have three-way interaction terms
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and the following year. For FDI analysis, I use Fall forecasts for the following year. For
sovereign spreads I use both Spring and Fall forecasts for the following year so that
they correspond to second and fourth quarter sovereign spreads values. I focus only on
next-year forecasts, because they have longer time horizon, and therefore there is more
room for discretionary forecasting (Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008). Next-year
forecasts also enable me to avoid reverse causal relations.
Building on the findings in Chapter 2, I consider private forecasts as a benchmark
for political and bureaucratic unbiasedness. Therefore, I measure Forecast optimism as
the difference between IMF and private forecasts. Private forecasts are gathered from
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Reports. EIU publishes monthly forecasts,
but I use only the forecasts that are published in the same month of IMF forecasts. If
forecasts were not available for that month, I use the closest forecast preceding the
month of IMF publication.
To measure politically motivated bias, I interact forecast optimism with change in
a country’s Political affinity score. This measurement is based on a country’s voting
similarity with the United States at the UN General Assembly, and indicates how much
a country realigns its foreign policy towards the United States.13 The data range from
-1 to 1, with higher values indicating movement towards US preferences. Similarly, to
measure bureaucratically motivated bias I interact IMF forecast optimism with a
country’s Use of IMF credit as a percentage of its quota at the Fund. As noted earlier the
Fund provides optimistic forecasts to countries that have large outstanding credit in
order to defend its lending practices (Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2008). Also these
13See Strezhnev (2013) for the details of the measurement.
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countries are likelier to receive IMF loans in the future (Ramcharan, 2003). Thus, the
variable, Use of IMF credit, captures the Fund’s incentives to adjust the forecasts due to
bureaucratic motivations.
4.3 Results
Finally, I control for other determinants of FDI and sovereign bond spreads. For
FDI, I control for market size, economic development, trade openness, Natural resource
rents, Democracy level and State fragility. Market size, economic development and trade
openness are proxied by the log of Total GDP (in current US dollars), the log of GDP per
capita and the sum of exports and imports (% GDP); all form WDI Database. I expect
these variables to have a positive effect on FDI inflows. Democracies have higher policy
stability and fewer property rights violations (Jensen, 2003). Therefore, I expect
Democracy level to encourage more FDI inflows. Stable political regimes also provide
predictable environment for the investors. To measure stability, I include State fragility
which is a composite index of a country’s economic, political, social and security
effectiveness and legitimacy. The data range from 1 to 24, higher values indicating high
state fragility. I expect a negative association between State fragility and FDI inflows.
The data on both Democracy level and State fragility are from Polity IV dataset (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2012). Countries with natural resources provide lucrative profits to
investors. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between FDI inflows and Natural
resource rents. The data are from WDI database.
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Table 4.1: The effect of IMF GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IMF growth forecast 0.164 0.147
(0.064) ∗ ∗ (0.062) ∗ ∗
Forecast optimism −0.258 −0.460
(0.118) ∗ ∗ (0.133) ∗ ∗∗
∆ Political affinity −1.746
(1.751)
Use of IMF credit −0.131
(0.170)
IMF growth forecast × Forecast optimism −0.014 0.037
(0.012) (0.013) ∗ ∗∗
IMF growth forecast × Forecast optimism 0.348
× ∆ Political affinity (0.152) ∗ ∗
IMF growth forecast × Forecast optimism −0.045
× Use of IMF credit (0.011) ∗ ∗∗
FDIt−1 0.522 0.377 0.368
(0.023) ∗ ∗∗ (0.033) ∗ ∗∗ (0.032) ∗ ∗∗
Total GDP (log) −0.111 −0.328 −1.084
(0.904) (1.066) (1.003)
GDP per capita (log) −0.408 0.033 0.778
(1.023) (1.212) (1.154)
Trade openness 0.016 0.021 0.017
(0.008)∗ (0.010) ∗ ∗ (0.009)∗
Democracy Level 0.033 −0.016 −0.027
(0.062) (0.067) (0.064)
State fragility −0.034 0.000 0.048
(0.089) (0.102) (0.097)
Natural resource rents (% GDP) 0.045 0.046 0.047
(0.016) ∗ ∗∗ (0.017) ∗ ∗ (0.016) ∗ ∗∗
Inflation −0.033 −0.027 −0.025
(0.012) ∗ ∗∗ (0.019) (0.018)
Number of observations 891 698 700
Number of countries 86 75 75
R-Squared 0.420 0.330 0.344
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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For sovereign bond spreads, I control for Balance of trade (as of GDP), Fiscal balance
measured as the overall budget balance relative to GDP, GDP per capita and Total GDP
(log). An increase in these variables indicates an increase in the governments’ ability to
pay their debt. Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between these variables and
sovereign spreads. The data on the Balance of trade and Fiscal balance are from the
Business Monitor International (BMI) Database. GDP per capita and Total GDP are from
WDI Database. I also control for Total external debt (as of GDP) and Default history. I
expect Total external debt to have a positive effect on sovereign spreads. The data are
from BMI Database. Default history is coded as 1 if a country has defaulted on foreign
currency-dominated debt since 1970. Countries that defaulted on their debts have the
difficulty of tapping into international financial markets (Ozler, 1991). Therefore, I
expect a positive association between default history and sovereign spreads. The data
on default history are from Tomz and Wright (2010); I supplemented the data for the
recent years using Standard and Poor’s resources.14
Moreover, to control for external shocks, I use three-month US Treasury bill rate and
Oil prices. I expect positive coefficients for the Treasury bill rate and crude oil prices.
The data are quarterly, but I use only values of second and fourth quarter. The data on
US T-bill are from Datastream database. The data on oil prices are gathered from the
European Central Bank’s (ECB) Statistical Data Warehouse Database.15
Table 4.1 presents the results on the impact of IMF forecasts on FDI inflows
conditional on the type of bias. Model 1 is the base model in which I only include the
14http://www.standardandpoors.com
15Summary statistics are provided in the Appendix.
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control variables. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and
statistically significant meaning that previous foreign investments into a country creates
inertia and attracts new foreign investments. Natural resource rents is positively
associated with FDI inflows as expected indicating that countries with natural resources
such as oil, attract more foreign investment. Trade openness is also positively associated
with FDI inflows. The effect of these variables remain similar across all models. The
coefficient of Inflation is negative and statistically significant, but loses significance in
the Models 3 and 4.
Model 2 examines the effect of IMF GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows
conditional on politically motivated bias. The three-way interaction between GDP
growth forecasts, Forecast optimism and ∆Political affinity captures this effect.16 The
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant as expected.17
Still, the effect of interaction term can not be understood properly by focusing only on
the coefficients (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Thus, I calculate the marginal effects
of GDP growth forecasts and graphically displayed them with 90% confidence intervals
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
In regard to the marginal effect of GDP growth forecasts there are three possible
outcomes: first, if investors do not trust the IMF information, the marginal effects of
forecasts on FDI inflows should decrease as bias increases; second, if investors trust the
IMF information but bias does not provide any additional information, the marginal
effect of forecasts should remain the same across all bias levels; finally, if bias provides
16Note that the interaction between forecast optimism and affinity score measures politically motivated
bias.
17The analysis include all components of the three-way interaction term as suggested by Brambor, Clark
and Golder (2006). But I do not report all of them for reasons of brevity.
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positive information to the investors, the marginal effect of forecasts should increase as
bias increases.
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Figure 4.1.: Marginal effects of IMF
GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows
conditional on politically motivated
bias. ∆Political Affinity is set constant.
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Figure 4.2.: Marginal effects of IMF
GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows
conditional on politically motivated
bias. Forecast optimism is set constant.
Figure 4.1 displays the marginal effect of forecasts on FDI inflows conditional on
forecast optimism and ∆Political Affinity. The latter variable is set constant at two
standard deviations below and above its mean value. The graph shows that marginal
effects of IMF growth forecasts increase with optimism for countries that move
politically closer to the United States. The opposite is true for countries that move
politically away from the US. Figure 4.2 displays the marginal effects of IMF growth
while forecast optimism is set at constant values. The graph shows that for an
optimistic forecast, the marginal effects of growth forecasts increases as countries move
politically closer to the United States. Overall, the results show that investors respond
bias more positively for countries that move closer to the United States. Thus, the
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results support Hypothesis 1 which argues that FDI inflows will respond more
favorably to optimistic IMF forecasts if the optimism is motivated by US political
interests.
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Figure 4.3.: Marginal effects of IMF GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows conditional on bu-
reaucratically motivated bias. Use of IMF Credit is set constant.
Model 4 examines the effect of GDP growth forecasts on FDI inflows conditional
on bureaucratically motivated bias. Thus, it replaces the ∆Political affinity variable in
Model 2 with Use of IMF credit. The coefficient of GDP growth forecast is positive and
statistically significant as in Model 2. The triple interaction term is negatively and
statistically significantly associated with FDI inflows as expected. But, to further
72
analyze the effect of bureaucratically motivated forecasts, Figure 4.3 displays the
marginal effects. The figure shows that marginal effects of growth forecasts decreases
with IMF optimism for countries that have large outstanding debt to the Fund. Thus,
foreign investors discounts IMF optimism when it is bureaucratically motivated. On the
other hand, this effect is significant only for overly optimistic forecasts. The graph also
shows that investors respond positively to the forecast optimism for countries that have
no outstanding debt to the Fund. Thus, according to my theory when there is no reason
for bureaucratically motivated bias. To summarize, the results lend limited support to
Hypotheses 3 and show that foreign investors discount IMF forecasts when they are
adjusted due to Fund’s bureaucratic incentives.
Table 4.2 presents the results from estimation of sovereign bond spreads. Model 1
includes only the control variables; Balance of trade has a negative and statistically
significant effect on sovereign spreads. The coefficient of Total external debt is positive
and statistically significant meaning that as a country’s ability to pay its debt increases
the costs of future borrowing decreases. Thus, liquidity and solvency concerns are
important indicators of sovereign spreads. These results remain similar across all
models. Fiscal balance is negatively associated with sovereign spreads as expected, but it
loses statistical significance in the following models. Inflation reduces returns on
investment, thus countries with high levels of inflation borrow more costly. As expected
the results show that Inflation has a positive affect on sovereign spreads. Contrary to
my expectation, the coefficient of Oil prices is negative, suggesting that an increase in oil
prices increases a country’s ability to pay their debt obligations. This can be true for
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Table 4.2: The Effect of IMF forecasts on sovereign bond spreads
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IMF inflation forecasts 0.083 0.083
(0.019) ∗ ∗∗ (0.023) ∗ ∗∗
IMF growth forecasts −0.129
(0.024) ∗ ∗∗
Forecast optimism 0.146 0.122 0.071
(0.035) ∗ ∗∗ (0.035) ∗ ∗∗ (0.080)
∆Political affinity 0.855
(0.537)
Use of IMF credit 0.086 −0.055
(0.032) ∗ ∗∗ (0.038)
IMF forecasts × Forecast optimism −0.015 −0.009 0.023
(0.005) ∗ ∗∗ (0.004) ∗ ∗ (0.015)
IMF forecasts × Forecast optimism −0.182
× ∆Political affinity (0.079) ∗ ∗
IMF forecasts × Forecast optimism −0.003 −0.023
× Use of IMF credit (0.005) (0.008) ∗ ∗∗
Balance of trade −0.057 −0.058 −0.061 −0.058
(0.009) ∗ ∗∗ (0.010) ∗ ∗∗ (0.010) ∗ ∗∗ (0.009) ∗ ∗∗
Fiscal balance −0.019 −0.018 −0.013 0.006
(0.012)∗ (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Total external debt 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.005
(0.002) ∗ ∗∗ (0.002) ∗ ∗∗ (0.003)∗ (0.002)∗
GDP per capita (log) −0.042 0.040 0.004 −0.242
(0.103) (0.108) (0.110) (0.106) ∗ ∗
GDP growth 0.010 −0.005 −0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Inflation 0.033 0.020
(0.007) ∗ ∗∗ (0.008) ∗ ∗∗
Default history 0.153 0.148 0.198 0.111
(0.299) (0.294) (0.298) (0.280)
3 Month US Treasury Bill rate 0.002 0.009 0.010 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Oil prices −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 0.001
(0.002)∗ (0.002) (0.002) ∗ ∗ (0.002)
Number of observations 269 263 263 272
Number of countries 16 16 16 16
R-Squared 0.289 0.357 0.331 0.400
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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countries that are oil-exporters. Thus, oil-producing countries in my data might be
driving this result.
Model 2 of Table 4.2 examines the effect of inflation forecasts on sovereign spreads
conditional on politically motivated bias. The three-way interaction term between IMF
Inflation forecasts, Forecast optimism and ∆Political affinity tests this effect. As in the GDP
growth forecasts, there are three possible ways in which the interaction term can affect
sovereign spreads. They follow the same logic, but since higher inflation is not
desirable the expectations are in opposite with those of the GDP growth forecasts. First,
the marginal effects of inflation forecasts should increase with bias, if investors do not
have confidence in the IMF forecasts. Because inflation should be higher than the IMF’s
projections. Second, if investors believe that the IMF forecasts reflect the true conditions
of the economy, the marginal effect of inflation forecasts should remain the same for
any bias level. Lastly, if forecast bias provides additional information to the investors,
the marginal effect of inflation forecasts should decrease as bias increases.
Inflation forecasts is positively associated with sovereign spreads. The effect of
forecast optimism is positive and and statistically significant indicating that sovereign
bond investors discount IMF forecasts when they are more optimistic than the private
forecasts. As expected, the coefficient of the three-way interaction term is negative and
statistically significant. To analyze the interaction effects better, I plot the marginal
effects of inflation forecasts with corresponding confidence intervals in Figures 4.4 and
4.5. In Figure 4.4, ∆Political Affinity variable is set constant at two standard deviations
below and above its mean value. The graph shows that the marginal effects of IMF
inflation forecasts on sovereign spreads decreases with forecast optimism for countries
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that realign their foreign policy preferences towards the United States. Thus, investors
discount the negative effect if inflation on their investment for these countries. In
Figure 4.5, Forecast optimism is set at constant values. Similarly, the graph shows that for
an optimistic forecast, the marginal effects of the inflation decreases as countries move
politically closer to the United States. Thus, both results support Hypotheses 2 which
argues that sovereign credit markets respond positively to IMF forecasts if they are
biased due to political proximity to the United States.
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Figure 4.4.: Marginal effects of IMF in-
flation forecasts on sovereign spreads
conditional on politically motivated
bias. ∆Political Affinity is set constant.
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Figure 4.5.: Marginal effects of IMF in-
flation forecasts on sovereign spreads
conditional on politically motivated
bias. Forecast optimism is set constant.
Model 3 analyzes the effect of inflation forecasts on sovereign bond spreads
conditional on bureaucratically motivated bias. Thus, I replace ∆Political affinity in
Model 2 with Use of IMF credit. The triple interaction term has a negative effect on
sovereign spreads but does not reach statistical significance. Figure 4.6 displays the
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marginal effects of inflation forecasts with the corresponding 90% confidence intervals.
The figure shows that the marginal effect of inflation forecasts decreases as forecast
optimism increases. The slope is steeper for countries that have large outstanding credit
to the Fund, however the confidence intervals for both category of countries overlap,
thus there is no statistically significant difference between low and high borrowing
countries.
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Figure 4.6.: Marginal effects of IMF in-
flation forecasts on sovereign spreads
conditional on bureaucratically moti-
vated bias. Use of IMF Credit is set con-
stant.
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Figure 4.7.: Marginal effects of IMF
GDP growth forecasts on sovereign
spreads conditional on bureaucratically
motivated bias. Forecast optimism is set
constant.
Chapter 3 shows that GDP growth forecasts are more optimistic than private
forecasts for countries that are closely allied with the United States and that have large
outstanding debt to the Fund. This effect was less pronounced in the inflation forecasts.
Therefore, I replicate the analysis in Model 3 with IMF growth forecasts. Model 4
includes IMF growth forecasts; the coefficient is negative and statistically significant
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meaning that prospective economic growth reduces the cost of borrowing. The effect of
the triple interaction term is negative and statistically significant. To analyze the
interaction effect better, I plot the marginal effect of GDP growth forecasts in Figure 4.7.
In the graph, Forecast optimism is set constant at two standard deviations below and
above its mean value. The graph shows that for an optimistic forecast, marginal effect
of growth forecasts increases as countries become more indebted to the Fund. To put it
in another way, investors respond positively to the forecast optimism if it coincides
with a country’s special relationship with the Fund. Thus, this results lends support to
Hypotheses 4 which argues that sovereign credit investors respond positively to the
bureaucratically motivated optimism.
4.4 Conclusion
Previous scholarship on the IMF shows that the Fund provides preferential
treatment in lending to countries that are closely allied with the United State and that
have prolonged relationship with the Fund. IMF forecasts for these countries are also
systematically more optimistic. This paper examines how investors respond to these
optimistic forecasts especially given that there are other information providers such as
the private forecasters.
I argue that bias in IMF forecasts provides noneconomic information to the
investors. Politically motivated bias signals about long-term improvements in economic
conditions and investment climate. Both bureaucratically and politically motivated
biases reinforce the expectation that the IMF will help these countries in times of
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economic difficulty. The empirical findings support these arguments and show that
investors, according to their type, respond positively to the bias. The effect of IMF
forecasts on FDI inflows increases with politically motivated bias as political bias
indicates long-term improvements in the economy. Sovereign bond investors are more
concerned about a government’s ability to pay their debt obligations. Sovereign credit
markets respond positively (spreads decrease) to both types of biases as they signal
about the Fund’s commitment to help a country with balance of payment problems.
This chapter shows that investors in general respond positively to the information
coming from the IMF, despite other available sources of information. Even if forecasts
are biased and the bias is well-known, the sources of bias still provide additional
information for the investors and the investors respond to this information accordingly.
In the following chapter, I examine how governments utilize these optimistic IMF
forecasts.
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4.5 Appendix
Table 4.3: List of countries in the sample
Angola Ghana Pakistan
Albania Honduras Peru
Argentina Hungary Paraguay
Armenia Indonesia Philippines
Azerbaijan India Poland
Algeria Iran Qatar
Bahrain Jamaica Russia
Bangladesh Jordan Romania
Belarus Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia
Bulgaria Kenya Serbia
Bolivia Kyrgyz Republic Slovakia
Brazil Kuwait Slovenia
Botswana Latvia Syria
Chile Laos South Africa
China Lebanon Sri Lanka
Cameroon Libya Tajikistan
Cambodia Lithuania Thailand
Costa Rica Macedonia Tunisia
Colombia Mauritius Turkey
Croatia Malaysia Turkmenistan
Czech Republic Mexico Ukraine
Dominican Republic Moldova United Arab Emirates
Ecuador Mongolia Uruguay
Egypt Morocco Uzbekistan
El Salvador Mozambique Venezuela
Estonia Nicaragua Vietnam
Georgia Nigeria Yemen
Guatemala Oman Zambia
Guyana Panama
Notes. Countries in bold are included only is sovereign spreads analysis
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics, FDI inflows
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net FDI inflows (in billion US dollars) 3.606 8.130 −20.930 76.110
IMF growth forecast 4.768 2.382 −3.000 23.100
IMF inflation forecast 5.686 4.423 −3.500 43.500
Growth forecast optimism 0.167 1.404 −7.800 9.800
Political affinity to the US −0.552 0.293 −0.938 0.680
Use of IMF credit (log) 16.550 7.164 0.000 24.090
Total GDP (log) 24.260 1.588 20.360 28.540
GDP per capita (log) 7.981 1.153 5.066 11.560
Trade openness 87.42 35.824 20.230 220.400
Democracy Level 3.297 6.596 −10 10
Regime fragility 8.707 5.004 0 24
Natural resource rents (as of GDP) 12.670 16.196 0.002 94.640
Table 4.5: Summary statistics, sovereign spreads
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sovereign spreads (log) 0.026 0.98 −3.601 2.814
IMF inflation forecast 5.431 3.677 0.100 48.000
IMF growth forecast 4.669 1.824 −0.900 10.000
Inflation forecast optimism 0.209 1.517 −7.000 8.700
Political affinity to the US −0.572 0.27 −0.893 0.250
Use of IMF credit (log) 18.480 6.743 0.000 24.090
Balance of trade 2.808 6.825 −8.900 23.300
Fiscal balance −2.646 3.374 −12.100 7.800
Total external debt 37.290 25.811 3.600 156.000
GDP per capita (log) 8.280 0.874 5.937 9.640
GDP growth 3.638 3.637 −11.740 13.610
Default history 0.662 0.473 0.000 1.000
3-Month US Treasury Bill rate 1.621 1.710 0.020 4.890
Oil prices 52.250 20.000 22.700 84.640
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Chapter 5
How Useful are the IMF Forecasts for
Incumbent Governments?
This chapter examines the effect of international organizations on domestic politics by
looking at IMF forecast optimism. I argue that favorable IMF forecasts help
governments to pursue expansionary policies especially during elections years.
Governments can justify increasing spending on public services by basing their budget
plans on overly optimistic forecasts. They may also avoid necessary budget cuts even if
they foresee an economic downturn in the future but. In addition to the increase in
public spending, these forecasts may help governments to portray the future in a
positive light. Thus, governments can use optimistic forecasts to manipulate public
perception of the economy and increase their chances for reelection.
The empirical analyses on eighty-one advanced and developing economies show
that optimistic forecasts encourage expansionary policies, and thus lead to worsening
of budget balance. On the other hand, this effect does not show significant difference
between election and non-election years. Thus, although we observe increasing
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spending, we do not find evidence for business cycle behavior. In addition to that, the
results show that optimistic forecasts before the elections increases incumbent’s chances
for survival.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the informational
effects of IOs on domestic politics. Section 2 presents the theory and hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and method. Section 4 presents the results and a brief
conclusion follows.
5.1 International Organizations and Domestic Politics
The influence of international organizations (IOs) on domestic politics has long
been recognized in the literature (Matecki, 1956; Putnam, 1988; Martin and Simmons,
1998). IOs affect domestic politics by creating international norms and standards which
legitimizes certain behaviors. They provide information on the current state of the
member countries and their intended policy positions, and thus improve government
accountability and transparency. This way, they empower certain actors in domestic
politics and protect their rights and interests against government infringement. And
finally, by providing direct information they appeal to the public opinion and through
public pressure they shape and constrain the choice set of governments and other
domestic actors.
Recent literature on the informational effects of security institutions finds that IO
authorization can increase public support for the use of force in resolving international
conflicts. Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that the United Nations Security Council
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(UNSC) endorsement of use of force increases support for the US president by as many
as 9 points in presidential approval ratings. The intuition is that the public is generally
more conservative than the presidents in using force to solve international crisis. They
want to be sure that all peaceful means of persuasion have failed before making such
decisions. On this point, the UNSC preferences are similar to that of the public. Thus
an endorsement from the UNSC signals the public that all options have been exhausted.
International support is especially important among people who value
international institutions and who lack confidence in the president (Grieco et al., 2011).
Moreover, the public value more highly the approval of IOs that have a conservative
political stance. Chapman (2007) shows that the positive effect of UNSC endorsement
increases as heterogeneity of interests among the member countries increases.1
The political advantages of IO endorsement motivate the coercer states to work
through international organizations. Even leaders that have private agendas seek IO
approval for reelection concerns (Fang, 2008). Seeking IO approval also allow the
coercer state to signal benign intentions to the foreign publics and to the states that are
not involved in the conflict (Thompson, 2006).
The studies I have discussed so far show evidence that IOs affect public opinion,
but they do not suggest that IO involvement encourages government policy changes.
There are other studies that focus on this aspect of IO involvement. In a formal model
of compliance, Dai (2005) examines governments’ decision to comply with international
agreements in the presence of competing interest groups. She shows that electoral
1The effect of approval is positive, but their objection does not have the same effect. See Chapman (2007)
for the discussion.
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leverage and informational status of pro-compliance groups determine the level of
government compliance. Using 1985 Sulphur Protocol as an example, she demonstrates
that IO financing of researches on acid rain and the dissemination of these findings
strengthened environmental groups vis-a-vis the EU governments and led to serious
reductions in sulphur emissions.
Similarly, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002) examine domestic
determinants of international cooperation. They argue that voters penalize
governments for poor economic performance due to extractive policies. However, they
lack information to understand whether their government is rent-seeker or not. And
thus, they punish all government types equally during economic downturn. Using a
formal model, they show that democratic governments use international cooperation to
signal voters about their policy choices. They enter into trade agreements to
differentiate themselves from rent seeking leaders.2
There is also some evidence in the literature that voters are aware of the
discrepancies between information from the IOs and national governments. These
differences undermine governments’ credibility as an information provider. In order to
maintain their credibility, governments adopt domestic institutions of transparency.
Thus, international organizations’ role as an alternative information provider also
compels governments to be more transparent (Grigorescu, 2003).
On the other hand, International organizations’ comparative advantage in
information gathering and expert knowledge is a strategic asset and can be misused by
2Guzman (2006) finds that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are more likely to be signed by countries
with better “rule of law”.
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its members and the organization itself. Venzke (2008) argues that international
economic organizations can selectively publicize information that benefits its major
shareholders. Similarly, Vaubel (1986) argues that decisions adopted by IOs can help
governments to curb domestic opposition to certain policy stances. He argues that IOs
help incumbent governments electorally by helping to hide unpopular policies and by
disseminating false information. He argues that this is one of the reasons why
governments accept IO constraints on their autonomy.
Previous scholarship on the IMF provide some evidence for the misuse of IOs.
Vreeland (2003); Smith and Vreeland (2003) argue that reform minded governments
sometimes enter into IMF agreements in order to push unpopular economic reforms.
Governments use the IMF as a scapegoat for austerity measures and program failures,
but take credit for the successes. The studies also show that governments are aware of
electoral consequences of IMF involvement and manipulate this situation for their own
benefit. IMF programs require restrictive macroeconomic policies which are not popular
among the public. Therefore, governments avoid entering into IMF programs during
election years. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) find that governments are more likely to
enter IMF agreements at the beginning of their electoral terms. Similarly, Dreher (2004)
shows that IMF programs are more likely be interrupted during election times.
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, I theorize the effect of IMF forecasts on domestic politics. I argue
that IMF forecast optimism encourages government spending and helps incumbent
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governments get reelected. My argument centers around the economic voting behavior.
The literature shows that economy is the central topic in voters’ agenda and it has the
strongest impact on citizens’ assessment of government performance (Carey and Lebo,
2006; Holbrook, 2009). At the ballot box, voters generally reward the incumbent
government if the economy is doing well, and turn away from it if not (Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier, 2000).
This finding is robust across studies. But, to establish a link between IMF forecast
optimism and elections, we need to address three issues. First, do citizens consider
their individual economic well-being or overall performance of the national economy
when they vote for the government? Previous studies provide strong evidence for the
argument that voters consider national economic conditions when they evaluate
governments’ performance (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Carey and Lebo, 2006;
Sanders, 1996). They show that economic growth, decrease in consumer prices and in
unemployment rate increases governments’ chances for reelection. Second, do voters
vote prospectively or retrospectively? The findings are mixed on this issue. Studies
shows that both past experiences and future expectations affect voters’ evaluation of the
economy. Fiorina (1981) argues that future expectations are important, but past
experiences mostly determine citizens’ judgments. However, MacKuen, Erikson and
Stimson (1992) argue that voters will support the incumbent governments as long as
they are optimistic about the country’s economic prospects.
Third, if citizens base their voting decisions on past and future national economic
conditions, what sources do they use to form their economic perceptions? MacKuen,
Erikson and Stimson (1996) argue that the public are influenced by the discussions in
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the media. Economists, financial agents, and international institutions use large amount
of resources to forecast the near and distant economic future. This information is then
conveyed to the mass media and then to the mass public. The IMF is one of the
institutions that publishes this kind of information. It is mandated to oversee economic
and financial health of global economy. Besides reviewing global trends and
developments, they publish forecasts on individual member countries. The Fund’s
financial and human resources are unmatched by other institutions in terms of
gathering this information. Its independence and autonomy as an international
organization also increase the neutrality of the information relative to that provided by
national governments (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). There is also some evidence that
private information providers underinvest in developing economies and they are
generally biased towards pessimism (Ferri, 2004) Given these, I assume that IMF
forecasts carry more weight on public opinion than those published by national
governments and private institutions.
Since no one can definitively predict future economic conditions, there is room for
the governments to manipulate public perception. Incumbent governments can increase
the supply of the public goods during election years, hoping that voters will attribute
this increase to the well management of the economy.3 Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
(2004) find that Russian governments’ spending on health care, social safety nets,
education and cultural projects peak one or two months before the elections. But, they
show that governments compensate their excessive spending with austerity measures
during the months after the elections. Thus, increase in government expenditure does
3For a review of political business cycle literature see Blais and Nadeau (1992)
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not reflect on overall budget balance. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence in
the literature that during election years fiscal balances worsen due to increased
government spending (Pina and Venes, 2011; Shi and Svensson, 2006). For instance, Shi
and Svensson (2006) show that financial balance worsens by 1% during election years in
developing countries.
IOs willingly or unwillingly can play in the hand of incumbent governments in
manipulating public perception. Previous scholarship on the IMF shows that the Fund
provide larger loans and fewer conditions to member countries during election years,
enabling them to implement expansionary monetary and fiscal policies (Dreher and
Jensen, 2007; Vaubel, 2004; Dreher and Vaubel, 2004). The IMF also publishes optimistic
forecasts on macroeconomic and fiscal indicators during election years. Aldenhoff
(2007) shows that long-term forecasts for the industrial countries are optimistic and this
optimism is correlated with election years in the US.
Governments seeking reelection have powerful incentives to increase public
spending and create the illusion that the economy is doing well. A favorable forecast
from the IMF may justify increased government expenditure. Governments may also
use optimistic forecasts to avoid tax increases and spending cuts even if they foresee an
economic downturn in the future (Bohn, 2011). There is evidence in the literature that
governments rely on overly optimistic forecasts when they make budget plans for the
election years. Boylan (2008) finds that state budget plans in the election years are
based on overly optimistic forecasts in the United States. And these budget plans lead
to higher budget deficits in the following years (approximately $27 per capita in the
election year).
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Optimism in IMF forecasts may also encourage budget deficit even governments
do not have an incentive to manipulate public opinion. Favorable forecasts may signal
the government that the Fund will support these countries in adverse economic
conditions. This insurance may lead to excessive public spending, hence may yield to
worsening of budget balance. Dreher (2004) shows that a country’s budget deficit
increases as its borrowing potential in the Fund increases.
Optimistic forecasts can also directly affect elections by helping the governments
to shed a positive light on the future. Thus, incumbent governments may find it in their
advantage to publicize rosy IMF forecasts during election years. Economic agents can
efficiently assess all available information in the market, but the public lack tools to
analyze the accuracy of the forecasts and are more prone to buy in the information
from the IMF (Fratianni and Pattison, 1982). Therefore, I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Optimistic IMF forecasts encourage expansionary policies, and thus they lead to
worsening of budget balance. This effect is more pronounced during election years.
Hypothesis 2: Optimistic forecasts from the IMF before elections increases incumbent
government’s reelection prospects.
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5.3 Data and Method
5.3.1 Method
The empirical analyses employ time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data covering up
to eighty-one developed and developing countries from 2002 to 2012.4 I examine the
electoral effects of optimistic IMF forecasts, and thus focus on countries that have some
type of competitive electoral system. Therefore, the sample is restricted to only
Democracies and Mixed regimes as they are defined in Chiozza and Goemans (2004).5
The first dependent variable, budget balance as of GDP, is a continuous variable. The
Hausman test indicate a significant difference between fixed and random effects
specifications. Therefore I employ OLS model with fixed effects specification to test
Hypothesis 1. I include both country and year fixed effects.
The second dependent variable, election outcomes, is dichotomous. This analysis
covers up to 57 Democracies from 2002 and 2012.67 I employ a multilevel probit model
and allow for varying intercepts across countries and years to control for heterogeneity
(Gelman and Hill, 2007).8
4see Table 5.3 in the Appendix
5Using the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012) 21-point scale regime scores they coded countries with
7 or higher as Democracies, and countries with scores between -6 and 6 as Mixed regimes.
6see Table 5.3 in the Appendix. Countries in bold test are not included in this analysis.
7Note that, here I only include democracies; countries that have 7 and higher points in Polity IV Database.
8I identify the outliers and influential points using Cook’s distance test and I exclude them from the
analyses.
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5.3.2 The Data
I employ two analysis to test the hypotheses. The first one examines the effect of
IMF GDP forecasts on budget balance. The dependent variable is government Budget
balance as a share of GDP and the data are from Business Monitor International (BMI)
Database. In this measurement positive values indicate budget surplus.
The main explanatory variables are IMF GDP growth forecasts, Forecast optimism
and their interactions. IMF GDP forecasts are gathered from WEO reports. These
reports are published in the Spring (April) and Autumn (September or October) and
include forecasts for the current and the following year (IMF, 2002-2013). I include only
Autumn next-year forecasts in t− 1. The reason of this choice is that they are the latest
available IMF forecasts in t− 1 that predict the level of economic growth in year t and
they are published just before the beginning of a fiscal year. Forecast optimism is
measured by taking the difference between IMF and private forecasts. Private forecasts
are gathered from Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Reports. Forecast optimism
is calculated as follows:
Forecast optimismti,t−1 = IMF Forecast
t
i,t−1 − EIU Forecastti,t−1
Where i indicates the country and t is the time period. t− 1 in the subscript indicates
the year forecast is made; t in the superscript indicates the forecasted year.
I argue that favorable forecasts increases government spending especially during
election years. Therefore, I include a three-way interaction term between IMF GDP
growth forecasts, Forecast optimism and Elections to capture this effect. Elections counts the
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number of months to upcoming elections. But, I take its inverse so that higher numbers
now indicate closeness to elections. I include legislative elections when the chief
executive is the prime minister and executive elections when it is the president. The
data on elections are gathered from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck
et al., 2001).
I also include several control variables as suggested by previous studies. For
economic determinants of budget balance, I include lag of dependent variable, GDP
growth, GDP per capita, Unemployment rate, and Change in real debt servicing cost. Past
economic and social policies have long-term effects on future fiscal discipline. The lag
of dependent variable captures this effect. Poor countries generally have more
inefficient tax systems, therefore, they are more likely to run budget deficits (Roubini,
1991). GDP per capita controls for the effects of economic development level.
Unemployment may effect budget balance by decreasing revenues or increasing social
spending (Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, 1993). The data on GDP growth and GDP per
capita are from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. Unemployment rate data
are from BMI Database, but I supplemented the data from WEO Database for some of
the missing values.
Change in real debt servicing cost (DRB) increases the debt burden of the
government, thus worsens the fiscal discipline (Roubini, 1991). This variable is
measured as follows:
DRBi,t = ∆(ri,t − pii,t − gi,t)×Debti,t−1
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Where ri,t is the interest rate, pii,t is the inflation rate and gi,t is the GDP growth. The
data on these variables are from IMF WEO Database. Debti,t−1 is the total government
debt in the previous year and the data are from BMI Database.
To control for political determinants of budget balance, I include Government
fractionalization, Government ideology and Regime score. Government fractionalization is the
probability that two deputies randomly picked from the government members will be
from the different parties. I expect a negative association between government
fractionalization and budget balance. Government ideology is coded as 1 if the
government is a left-wing government and 0 otherwise. Both variables are from DPI
Database (Beck et al., 2001). Regime score measures a country’s democracy level and the
data are from Polity Database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). I expect governments with
more political constraints to have better budget discipline.9
In the second analysis, I investigate the affect of IMF GDP growth forecasts on
election outcomes. The dependent variable, Election outcomes, is a dichotomous variable
which equals to 1 when voters reelect the incumbent party/leader and 0 otherwise. In
presidential systems, this variable is coded as 1 when the incumbent cannot run for an
additional term and the incoming president is from the same party. In parliamentary
systems, Election outcomes is coded as 0 when the largest government party lost its lead
in the following elections, but continues to be in the new coalition government. The
information on these variables are gathered from Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al., 2001).
9See Table 5.4 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics.
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The main explanatory variables are IMF GDP growth forecasts, Forecast optimism
and their interactions. These variables are calculated in the same way they are
calculated in the budget balance analysis. The difference is that I include the forecasts
that are closest preceding to the elections.10
For economic determinants of election outcomes, I control for Current account
balance, Unemployment rate, GDP growth, Inflation rate and Government expenditure. Voters
reward the incumbent government if the economy is doing well. Thus, I expect
Unemployment and Inflation rate to have a negative effect on election outcomes. For the
rest of the variables I expect a positive effect. The data on Current account balance,
Unemployment rate, and GDP growth are from WEO Database. The data on Inflation rate
and Government expenditure are from World Development Indicators (WDI) and BMI
Databases. These variables are lagged one year.
Finally, I include Incumbent governments’ term in the office, Vote share of the
government parties and Presidential system to control for political determinants of election
outcomes. The data on these variables are from the Database of Political Institutions
(Beck et al., 2001).11
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 presents results on the impact IMF growth forecasts and forecast
optimism on government budget balance. Model 1 is the basic model in which I
10For elections from January to April, I use previous years’ Autumn next-year forecasts; from May to Oc-
tober, current years’ Spring current-year forecasts; and from October to December, current years’ Autumn
current-year forecasts.
11See Table 5.5 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics
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Table 5.1: The effect of IMF GDP growth forecasts on government budget balance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IMF growth forecast 0.247 0.252 0.254
(0.067) ∗ ∗∗ (0.067) ∗ ∗∗ (0.074) ∗ ∗∗
Forecast optimism −0.217 0.003 −0.032
(0.095) ∗ ∗ (0.177) (0.201)
Elections −0.130 −0.126 −0.128 −0.126
(0.046) ∗ ∗∗ (0.055) ∗ ∗ (0.055) ∗ ∗ (0.141)
IMF growth forecast × −0.060 −0.050
Forecasts optimism (0.040) (0.047)
IMF growth forecast × −0.016
Forecasts optimism × Elections (0.039)
Budget balance t−1 0.588 0.576 0.523 0.522 0.522
(0.025) ∗ ∗∗ (0.027) ∗ ∗∗ (0.034) ∗ ∗∗ (0.034) ∗ ∗∗ (0.034) ∗ ∗∗
Unemployment rate −0.061 −0.067 −0.012 −0.013 −0.010
(0.027) ∗ ∗ (0.030) ∗ ∗ (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
∆ real debt-servicing cost −4.968 −4.567 −5.646 −6.203 −6.129
(1.232) ∗ ∗∗ (1.280) ∗ ∗∗ (1.591) ∗ ∗∗ (1.634) ∗ ∗∗ (1.648) ∗ ∗∗
GDP per capita (log) −0.875 −0.872 −0.822 −0.804 −0.801
(0.152) ∗ ∗∗ (0.174) ∗ ∗∗ (0.279) ∗ ∗∗ (0.279) ∗ ∗∗ (0.281) ∗ ∗∗
Government fractionalization −0.422 −0.313 −0.241 −0.222
(0.436) (0.588) (0.590) (0.593)
Government ideology 0.142 0.083 0.110 0.110
(0.191) (0.221) (0.222) (0.223)
Regime score −0.023 −0.017 −0.017 −0.021
(0.048) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
Number of observations 998 857 627 627 627
Number of countries 81 80 72 72 72
R-Squared 0.423 0.422 0.416 0.419 0.419
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
include only the economic determinants of budget balance. The coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant, confirming the
argument that past economic policy choices have long-term effects on future fiscal
discipline. ∆Real debt servicing cost is negatively and statistically associated with budget
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balance indicating that increase in debt-servicing costs puts extra burden government
budget. These results remain similar across all models. The effect of Unemployment rate
on budget balance is negative but reaches to statistical significance only in the first two
models. The coefficient of GDP per capita is in the opposite direction than predicted
suggesting that economically advanced countries are more likely to have budget
deficits. This confirms some earlier findings which argue that demand for public
services increases with economic affluence.12
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Figure 5.1.: Marginal effects of forecast bias on budget balance conditional on the level
of forecast optimism
12See Blais and Nadeau (1992) for the discussion.
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Model 2 adds political variables to the analysis. The effect of elections on budget
balance is negative and statistically significant, indicating that governments pursue
expansionary policies during election years. On the average, budget balance decreases
by 0.13 % during election years. The coefficients of Government fractionalization and
Regime score are in the expected direction, but they fail to achieve statistical significance.
Model 3 includes IMF GDP growth forecasts and Forecast optimism. The coefficient
of Forecast optimism is negative and statistically significant as expected. This finding
supports Hypotheses 1 which argues that IMF forecast optimism encourages
government spending and worsens budget balance. 1 unit increase in forecast optimism
decreases budget balance by approximately 0.2 %.
Model 4 introduces the interaction between IMF GDP growth forecasts and Forecast
optimism to capture the conditional effect of GDP growth forecasts on budget balance.
The coefficient of the interaction term is negative as expected, but fails to achieve
statistical significance. To understand the interaction effect properly, I plot the marginal
effects of GDP growth forecasts with corresponding confidence intervals.13 Figure 5.1
shows that the marginal effects of IMF growth forecasts on budget balance decreases
with forecast optimism. Thus, the positive effect of growth on budget balance
diminishes as IMF forecasts differ from the private forecasts. This finding partially
supports Hypothesis 1 that optimism in IMF forecasts leads to reduced fiscal
performance. But this effect is not statistically significant for overly optimistic forecasts.
13In all marginal effects plots, confidence intervals indicate statistical significance at 90% level.
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Figure 5.2.: Marginal effects of IMF GDP growth forecast on budget balance conditional
on the level of forecast optimism and elections.
Model 5 introduces the triple interaction between IMF GDP growth forecasts,
Forecast optimism and Elections.14 This variable captures the effect of IMF growth
forecasts on budget balance conditional on forecast optimism and elections. The
coefficient of the triple interactions is negative as predicted, but fails to achieve
statistical significance. Figure 5.2 displays the marginal effects of forecasts with
confidence interval lines. As in Figure 5.1, this graph shows that the marginal effects of
growth forecasts decrease with IMF optimism. On the other hand, this effect does not
14I include all constitutive terms of the interaction as suggested by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), but
I do not report all of them in Table 5.1.
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show difference between election and non-election years. Overall, these findings show
that governments receiving optimistic forecasts are more likely to expand the economy,
but there is no evidence that they would do it more often during election years.
Next, I examine whether optimistic forecasts benefit governments electorally by
helping them to create positive expectations about the future of the economy. Table 5.2
presents the results on election outcomes. Model 1 is the basic model in which I include
all control variables. The coefficient of Current account balance is positive and
statistically significant as expected and remains unchanged across all models. Similarly,
GDP growth is positively associated with election outcomes. The coefficients of
Government expenditure and Inflation rate are in the expected direction, but fail to achieve
statistical significance. Overall, these findings lend some support for economic voting
behavior. Since these variables are all lagged one year, the results also show some
support to the arguments that retrospective economic perceptions affect election
outcomes. Regarding the political variables, the effect of Government fractionalization is
negative and statistically significant, meaning that coalition governments are less likely
to survive in the following elections. Incumbent’s term in office is also negatively
associated with reelection. This suggests that governments are more likely to get
reelected for a second term, but their reelection chances decreases as they stay longer.
Model 2 replaces GDP growth with IMF growth forecast and includes Forecast
optimism. IMF growth forecast has statistically significant effect on elections. This effect is
larger than the effect of GDP growth in Model 1, perhaps suggesting that future
economic growth have stronger effect on voter’s perception of the government
performance. The effect of Forecast optimism is positive as expected but fails to achieve
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Table 5.2: The effect of IMF GDP growth forecasts on election outcomes, probit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IMF growth forecast 0.172 0.159
(0.080) ∗ ∗ (0.088)∗
Forecast optimism 0.177 0.137
(0.207) (0.238)
IMF growth forecast × Forecasts optimism 0.021
(0.062)
Current account balance 0.086 0.093 0.091
(0.031) ∗ ∗∗ (0.035) ∗ ∗∗ (0.035) ∗ ∗∗
Unemployment rate 0.019 0.026 0.026
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
Economic growth 0.103
(0.057)∗
Inflation rate −0.038 −0.048 −0.049
(0.034) (0.039) (0.039)
Government expenditure (% GDP) 0.002 0.022 0.023
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)∗
Government fractionalization −1.321 −1.508 −1.518
(0.670) ∗ ∗ (0.769) ∗ ∗ (0.770) ∗ ∗
Incumbent’s term in office −0.628 −0.621 −0.621
(0.231) ∗ ∗∗ (0.249) ∗ ∗ (0.248) ∗ ∗
Vote share of government’s parties 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Presidential system −0.330 −0.034 −0.013
(0.435) (0.481) (0.486)
Number of observations 172 142 142
Number of countries 57 56 56
Log likelihood -109.2 -88.2 -88.1
AIC 240.4 200.4 202.3
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
statistical significance. In this model, the coefficient of Government expenditure reaches to
statistical significance and remains so in the following model.
In Model 3, I introduce the interaction between IMF growth forecast with Forecast
optimism. This interaction term captures the effect of GDP forecasts conditional on
forecast optimism. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive as expected, but
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Figure 5.3.: Marginal effects of IMF GDP growth forecast on election outcomes condi-
tional on the level of forecast optimism
fails to achieve statistical significance. To interpret the interaction effect better, I plot the
marginal effects with confidence intervals in Figure 5.3. The graph shows that IMF
growth forecasts positively affect election outcomes and this effect increases as forecasts
become more optimistic, thus lends support to Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, this
effect is not very substantial. Keeping the growth rate constant, 1 unit increase in
forecast optimism increases governments chances for reelection by 2 %. Moreover, the
effect is not significant for high values of IMF optimism.
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5.5 Conclusion
International organizations devote large amounts of intellectual and human
resources in gathering information on member countries’ future economic
performances. This information attracts attention in the public media because IOs are
believed to have expert knowledge and trusted to be free from national biases.
However, previous studies show that IOs, in particular the IMF, sometimes provide
overly optimistic forecasts to help member governments. In this chapter, I examine how
these optimistic forecasts affect domestic politics and whether incumbent governments
benefit from this favorable information.
I argue that optimistic forecasts enable incumbent governments to manipulate
public perception of the economy. Governments can rely on optimistic forecasts when
they plan the budget. This way, they can increase public spending and avoid budget
cuts hoping to convince the public that the economy is well managed. They can also
use optimistic forecasts to increase positive expectations about the economy. Therefore,
they can increase their chances for reelection.
I test the hypotheses on a sample of eighty-one countries from 2002 to 2012. The
results provide strong support for the link between favorable forecasts and budgetary
expansion. On the other hand, I couldn’t find support for the argument that optimistic
forecasts encourage governments to pursue more expansionary policies during election
years. The effect does not show difference between election and non-election years. In
addition to that, the results lend some support to my argument that optimistic forecast
can directly help incumbent governments get reelected by increasing economic
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expectations. However, this positive effect is not very substantial and only significant
for low levels of forecast optimism.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.3: List of countries in the sample
Albania Greece Nigeria
Argentina Guatemala Nicaragua
Armenia Honduras Netherlands
Australia Croatia Norway
Belgium Hungary New Zealand
Bulgaria Indonesia Pakistan
Bolivia Ireland Panama
Brazil Iran Peru
Botswana Israel Philippines
Canada Italy Poland
Switzerland Jamaica Portugal
Chile Jordan Paraguay
Costa Rica Japan Romania
Colombia Kazakhstan Russia
Czech Republic Kenya Thailand
Germany Kyrgyz Republic Singapore
Denmark Cambodia El Salvador
Dominican Republic South Korea Serbia
Algeria Sri Lanka Slovakia
Ecuador Lithuania Slovenia
Egypt Latvia Sweden
Spain Morocco Turkey
Estonia Moldova Ukraine
Finland Mexico Uruguay
France Macedonia Venezuela
United Kingdom Mozambique South Africa
Georgia Mauritius Zambia
Malaysia
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics, Government budget deficit
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Budget balance t−1 −1.681 5.420 −30.900 35.200
IMF growth forecast 3.641 2.133 −3.000 21.000
Forecast bias 0.178 1.036 −4.300 8.400
Elections 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000
Unemployment rate 8.798 4.812 0.400 28.150
Interest rate 4.563 8.617 −40.074 66.343
Change in total government debt 1.01 7.704 −75.399 94.000
Inflation rate 5.36 8.055 −9.798 95.005
GDP per capita (log) 4.229 4.238 2.143 4.998
Margin of majority 0.608 0.176 0.174 1.000
Government fractionalization 0.292 0.287 0.000 0.828
Government ideology 0.456 0.464 0.000 1.000
Regime score 6.296 5.643 −10.000 10.000
EIU GDP growth forecasts errort−1 0.087 3.714 −13.881 21.929
Table 5.5: Summary statistics, Election outcomes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IMF growth forecast (for the following year) 3.012 1.817 −3.000 9.000
Forecast bias (for the following year) 0.162 0.810 −2.400 3.100
IMF growth forecast (for the current year) 2.49 2.931 −10.000 11.000
Forecast bias (for the current year) 0.068 0.721 −2.000 3.400
Current account balance (% of GDP) −0.899 6.572 −23.100 17.600
Unemployment rate 8.682 4.677 1.500 28.000
Inflation rate 4.119 5.809 1.146 54.400
Government consumption (log) 11.045 11.236 9.127 11.928
Expansion of overall budget deficit 0.0371 3.614 −36.200 24.090
Government fractionalization 0.336 0.278 0.000 0.828
Incumbent’s years in office 4.651 2.221 1.000 37.800
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This dissertation examines the informational effects of International Organizations by
studying the effect of IMF WEO economic growth and inflation forecasts on investors
and governments. Two strands of research motivate this work: one argues that IOs
provide quality information because they are centralized and independent. The other
argues that IOs, as any bureaucratic institution, may not function as they are intended
to. They can selectively provide information that benefits the institution itself or their
main principles. IMF forecasts provide a unique opportunity to examine these two
approaches. Since there are alternative information providers such as the private
forecasters, governments and investors may choose to ignore these forecasts and look at
other resources or they can utilize them if they believe that the forecasts contain
valuable information.
The dissertation starts by comparing the performance of IMF forecasts to those of
private forecasters. I show that overall private forecasts perform better than the IMF
forecasts in predicting the magnitude and direction of economic growth and inflation.
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Then, I examine the conditions in which IMF forecasts differ from the private forecasts.
Similar to the earlier studies, the results show that countries that share similar interests
with the United States and that have prolonged relationship with the Fund receive
optimistic forecasts, meaning that the Fund’s bureaucratic incentives and the influence
of major principals of the Fund leads to optimism in IMF forecasts.
In Chapter 4, I theorize how investors respond to the optimistic forecasts. I argue
that bias in IMF forecasts provide valuable noneconomic information to the investors.
Bias towards optimism in IMF forecasts signals investors about the Fund and US
commitment to help these countries during economic downturn. Thus, they respond to
this information positively by increasing their investment. The empirical analyses
support this argument and show that FDI inflows into a country increases with forecast
optimism. Also sovereign credit markets respond positively to both politically and
bureaucratically motivated bias.
Chapter 5 theorizes the effect of optimistic forecasts on domestic politics. The
theory here builds on economic voting behavior which argues that voters reward the
incumbent governments for economic competence. I argue that optimistic forecast help
incumbent governments to manipulate public perception of the economy, either by
increasing spending during election years or by publicizing IMF optimism. The
analyses show that government budget deficit increases with forecast optimism.
However, this effect is not different between election and non-election years. The results
also show that forecast optimism helps governments get reelected.
Overall, the results show that the informational effects of IOs are more nuanced
than the two strands of research suggests. It seems that both governments and
110
investors are aware of the imperfection of the international organizations as
information providers. On the other hand, both actors, in different ways, acknowledge
their power and influence.
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